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ABSTRACT 
 
The “sanctions war” between the West and Russia, the worst crisis 
since the end of the Cold War, again raises the issue of whether the 
imposition of economic sanctions without authorization of the U.N. 
Security Council is permissible under international law.  In this Article, I 
analyze the legal justifications and contemporary sanctions practice of the 
United States, and the evolution of Russia’s arguments against the use of 
those economic sanctions.  On the basis of a brief case study analysis of 
episodes related to the imposition of the tacit trade embargo upon Russia’s 
neighboring countries, I argue that while on political and diplomatic levels 
the United States and Russia demonstrate opposite views towards the 
legality of unilateral economic sanctions, today, at its very core, the actual 
activity of both states tends to make unilateral sanctions more recognizable 
as a part of international customary law.   
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States’ economic sanctions imposed upon Russia in 
recent years may be considered as a reversion to the Cold-War-era 
campaign of sanctions against the Soviet Union.1  In the 1990’s, 
economic sanctions, which originally had been regarded as one of 
the key elements of the containment strategy, became a very popular 
instrument of the United States’ foreign policy.  Meanwhile, the 
current efforts toward the political and economic isolation of Russia 
have revived traditional debates between the “old protagonists” 
regarding the legality of the deployments of economic sanctions 
without authorization of the U.N. Security Council under 
international law. 
Despite the fact that following the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union the major part of U.S. laws and policies regarding the 
restriction of bilateral trade were abolished, some of them 
continuously applied to Russia as the successor of the Soviet Union.2  
The most illustrative example of such “relics,” is the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974.3  It restrained trade relations 
between the United States and non-market economies that restrict 
freedom of emigration and remained valid,4 though post-Cold War 
                                                     
1 For instance, Michael McFaul, the former U.S. Ambassador to the Russian 
Federation, emphasizes that the current sanctions against Russian companies are 
“more comprehensive than anything was done during the Cold War including 
during the Reagan days.”  Michael McFaul, Confronting Putin’s Russia: Long-Term 
Economic and Foreign Policy Implications, Lecture at the Christopher H. Browne 
Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania (Oct. 30, 2014), 
available at https://bc.sas.upenn.edu/anspach-lecture. 
2 See, e.g., Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, Address at the 
meeting with State Duma deputies, Federation Council members, heads of Russian regions 
and civil society representatives in the Kremlin (Mar. 18, 2014), 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889 (“Today, we are being threatened with 
sanctions, but we already experience many limitations, ones that are quite 
significant for us, our economy and our nation.  For example, still during the times 
of the Cold War, the US and subsequently other nations restricted a large list of 
technologies and equipment from being sold to the USSR, creating the 
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls list.  Today, they have 
formally been eliminated, but only formally; and in reality, many limitations are 
still in effect.  In short, we have every reason to assume that the infamous policy of 
containment, led in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, continues today.”). 
3 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (repealed 2012). 
4 Since 1992, the trade restrictions against Russia had been waived by U.S.  
Presidents on year-by-year basis; and, in 2012, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment was 
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economic reforms had brought Russian market and immigration 
rules completely in line with all its requirements almost two decades 
before.5 Consequently, in the light of the fifty-year history of almost 
permanent economic restrictions placed upon the Soviet Union and, 
later, upon post-Soviet Russia, it is hardly surprising that Russia has 
not only never changed its traditional position regarding illegality 
of “unilateral” sanctions imposed without express authorization of 
the U.N. Security Council,6 but also joined its efforts with China and 
other members of the U.N. Security Council to veto most U.S. 
sanctions initiatives against rogue countries.7 
This Article argues that while on political and diplomatic levels 
the United States and Russia demonstrate opposing views toward 
the legality of unilateral economic sanctions, the actual activity of 
these powerful Security Council permanent members in the 
international arena tends to make unilateral sanctions more 
recognizable as a part of customary international law.   
As it is shown later in this Article, modern Russia also uses an 
implicit trade embargo as an instrument of its foreign policy in 
relations with neighboring countries.8  Moreover, immediately 
following the announcement of the creation of the single market of 
the Eurasian Economic Union, Russia started to pressure Belarus 
and Kazakhstan to comply with its policy of trade restriction against 
third countries.9  Nevertheless, Russia’s strong opposition to U.S. 
                                                     
replaced by the Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky 
Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012. 
5 See, e.g., John Quigley, Most-Favored-Nation Status and Soviet Emigration: Does 
the Jackson-Vanik Amendment Apply, 11 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 543, 545-548 
(1989) (“there is no factual basis for applying it to the U.S.S.R.”).  For a more 
detailed discussion about rescinding the Jackson-Vanik application to Russia, see 
Robert H. Brumley, Jackson-Vanik: Hard Facts, Bad Law, 8 B.U. INT'L L. J. 363, 368-371 
(1990); Kevin M. Cowan, Cold War Trade Statutes: Is Jackson-Vanik Still Relevant, 42 
U. KAN. L. REV. 737, 751-757 (1993-1994). 
6 For the purposes of this Article, the term “unilateral” refers to actions taken 
by states without the mandate of the UN Security Council; the “unilateral” actions 
of a state does not mean that other states may not take similar “unilateral“ actions 
as well. 
7 See Jeffrey A. Meyer, Second Thoughts on Secondary Sanctions, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L 
L. 905, 919-924 (2014) (assessing the role of Russia and China in opposing U.S. 
efforts in the Security Council to place aggressive sanctions against Iran, Sudan, 
Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Iraq). 
8 For instance, Russia banned the imports of goods form Poland (2005), 
Moldova (2005), Georgia (2006), Ukraine (2006), Latvia (2006), etc. 
9 See, e.g., Belarus, Kazakhstan Oppose Ukraine Import Restrictions, THE MOSCOW 
TIMES, June 30, 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/            
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unilateral economic coercion measures is based on its desire (1) to 
increase the role of the U.N. Security Council and, thereby, the 
powers of its permanent members, (2) to maintain moral ascendancy 
over opponents, getting support of developing countries in debates 
on the legitimacy of unilateral sanctions, and (3) to keep strong legal 
arguments contesting potential economic sanctions against Russia 
and its allies.  The opposing approaches of both the United States 
and Russia are summarized in table 1. 
 
Table 1.  Approaches toward the use of unilateral economic 
sanctions 
 
The United States 
The Russian 
Federation 
Official position:  a sovereign right of 
the United States to 
regulate its trade 
relations with other 
nations / legitimate 
self-help acts / an 
element of economic 
statecraft 
a violation of 
international law 
Practice: 
 own activity 
 
explicit unilateral 
sanctions 
 
tacit unilateral 
sanctions 
 alliances / 
international 
cooperation 
 
global or regional 
alliances 
 
regional alliances  
 
Additionally, this Article argues that Russia should change its 
approach to the tacit use of unilateral coercive measures against the 
neighboring states because – despite the variety of formal names or 
                                                     
belarus-kazakhstan-nix-ukraine-imports-restriction-proposal/502719.html (on 
Belarus’s and Kazakhstan’s opposition to proposed restrictions from Ukraine to the 
Customs Union); Margarita Liutova & Anfisa Voronina, Ni Kazakhstan, ni Belorussiia 
ne otkazhutsia ot importa iz ES [Neither Kazakhstan nor Belarus refuse export from the 
EU], VEDOMOSTI, Aug. 12, 2014 (Russ.), 
http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/32013971/soyuz-lomitsya-ot-edy (on 
Kazakhstan’s and Belarus’s refusal to cease importing certain goods from the 
European Union).  
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grounds of Russia’s trade bans – such a Janus-faced foreign policy 
may significantly weaken available arguments justifying the 
unlawful character of the current anti-Russia sanctions campaign 
proclaimed by the United States and the European Union. 
Part 2 provides a historical overview of the role of U.S. unilateral 
sanctions in relations between the United States and the Soviet 
Union / Russian Federation.  It pays special attention to the 
differences and similarities of Cold War-era sanctions against 
Communist countries and the current economic sanctions campaign 
against Russia.  Part 3 discusses the major international law 
concerns raised by the U.S. sanctions practice and justifications of 
the use of unilateral economic sanctions.  Part 4 addresses the 
evolution of Russia’s legal arguments against unilateral sanctions, 
and the development of legislation on special economic measures in 
the 2000s.  Part 4 presents the results of a brief case study analysis of 
episodes where Russia allegedly imposed tacit trade embargoes 
upon neighboring countries, and includes the author’s 
recommendations for further Russian strategy.  Part 5 provides a 
conclusion. 
 
2.  U.S.-RUSSIA TRADE RESTRICTIONS: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW10 
 
2.1. The Cold War 
 
Following the victory over the Axis Powers in World War II, 
somewhat clouded relations between the former Allies caused the 
extension of U.S. wartime trade restrictions with respect to control 
goods exported to the USSR and other countries of the Communist 
block.11  After a series of one-year extensions of the wartime controls, 
                                                     
10 While this Part of the Article covers the post-WWII period of history only, it 
is noted that the first wave of U.S. economic sanctions against Soviet Russia was 
imposed in 1919, within the period of U.S. participation in the Allied intervention 
to Russia, also known as the Polar Bear Expedition.  See, e.g., MICHAEL P. MALLOY, 
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND U.S. TRADE 188 (1990) (stating the period of the first 
sanction campaign against the USSR). 
11 See, e.g., BRUCE E. CLUBB, UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE LAW 134-135 (1991); 
Harold J. Berman & John R. Garson, United States Export Controls-Past, Present, and 
Future, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 791, 794-795 (1967). 
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Congress enacted the Export Control Act of 1949,12 the first 
legislative act adopting the comprehensive system of export control 
in order to deny supplies of strategic materials or military 
equipment to Communist countries.13  Around the same time 
period, the United States initiated the formation of a multilateral 
export control system with participation of Western European 
governments, which was later institutionalized as the Coordinating 
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom).14  Two years 
later, the President was authorized under the Trade Agreement 
Extension Act of 195115 to terminate most favored nation treatment 
for the USSR and its satellites, and the Trade Expansion Act of 196216 
almost eliminated the possibility of granting any trade concession to 
the Soviet Union.17  
In addition to general export controls against the Communist 
block, “basically commodity specific in their orientation”,18 at 
various times other unilateral economic measures were triggered by 
certain political developments in the Soviet Union.  For example, in 
1974, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which prevented granting 
most-favored nation status to the USSR because of Soviet restriction 
upon Jewish emigration, almost brought to naught the previous 
attempts of the Nixon administration to return to normality in 
                                                     
12 63 Stat. 7, 81 P.L. 11, 63 Stat. 7, 81 Cong. Ch. 11 (expired 1969) (in accordance 
with Sec. 3(a) of the Act the President might "prohibit or curtail the exportation 
from the United States . . . of any articles, materials, or supplies including technical 
data, except under such rules and regulations as he shall prescribe").  
13 See generally Paul H. Silverstone, The Export Control Act of 1949: 
Extraterritorial Enforcement, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 331, 331-362 (1959). 
14 See, e.g., MICHAEL MASTANDUNO, ECONOMIC CONTAINMENT: COCOM AND THE 
POLITICS OF EAST-WEST TRADE 78-82 (1992) (explaining the role of the United States 
in the formation of CoCom); GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, ECONOMIC 
SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY 211-216 (1985) (providing 
an overview of the U.S, and CoCom sanctions against the USSR and Comecon since 
1948 to 1985, and the goals of sender countries). 
15 5 Stat. 72, 82 P.L. 50, 65 Stat. 72, 82 Cong. Ch. 141. 
16 76 Stat. 872, 87 P.L. 794, 76 Stat. 872. 
17 See BRUCE E. CLUBB, supra note 11 at 140-142.  While, as a result of U.S. policy 
of détente with the Communist block, in 1972, the United States and the Soviet 
Union entered into the Trade Agreement, it had been never ratified because of 
continuing tensions between the countries (e.g., U.S. support of human right 
movement in the USSR, the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan and the imposition of 
martial law in Poland).  See, e.g., id. at 142, 144; THOMAS W. HOYA, EAST-WEST TRADE: 
COMECON LAW: AMERICAN-SOVIET TRADE 40-41 (1984). 
18 MALLOY, supra note 10, at 212.  
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bilateral trade.19  Further, from 1978 to 1980, the United States 
banned the exports of technologies to the Soviet Union in response 
to the arrests of well-known dissidents - Aleksander I. Ginzburg and 
Anatoly B. Shcharansky.20  
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 25, 
1979, the Carter administration called for the immediate withdrawal 
of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and took several responsive 
measures, including a boycott of the Moscow Summer Olympics, 
and an imposition of grain, technology and phosphate embargoes.21  
While the Summer Olympics boycott had a symbolic rather than 
practical effect,22 the economic impact of other sanctions against the 
USSR was assessed controversially.  For instance, the grain embargo 
of 1980-1981 was widely criticized because of its minimal effect on 
Soviet economy, which successfully replaced U.S. grain with 
supplies from other countries, and overall negative consequences 
for the U.S. agriculture industry.23  Another notorious example of 
economic restrictions placed against the Soviet Union was the 
                                                     
19 See generally Stanley D. Metzger, Most-Favored-Nation Treatment of Imports to 
the U.S. from the U.S.S.R., 1 INT'L TRADE L.J. 79, 79-86 (1975-1976); see also HUFBAUER 
& SCHOTT, supra note 14, at 508-511 (providing a chronology of events and a list of 
pursued goals). 
20 See LISA L. MARTIN, COERCIVE COOPERATION: EXPLAINING MULTILATERAL 
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 198-201 (1992) (arguing that the ineffectiveness of those 
sanctions was caused by the low level of international cooperation between the 
United States and its allies).  See also HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 14, at 603-604 
(providing a chronology of events and a pursued goal). 
21 See, e.g., MARTIN, supra note 20, at 191-198 (1992) (overviewing the 
background and U.S. efforts to coordinate high-technology sanctions against the 
USSR with other countries); HOMER E. MOYER, JR. & LINDA A. MABRY, EXPORT 
CONTROLS AS INSTRUMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY: THE HISTORY, LEGAL ISSUES, AND 
POLICY LESSONS OF THREE RECENT CASES 27-43 (1988) (describing the reasons and 
essence of Afghanistan related sanctions). See also HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 
14, at 655-659 (providing a chronology of events and a list of pursued goals). 
22 See Kim Richard Nossal, Knowing When to Fold: Western Sanctions against the 
USSR 1980-1983, 44 INT'L J. 698, 705 (1988-1989) (“because of the symbolic political 
importance of the Olympic Games in East-West relations in general, and Soviet-
American relations in particular, embracing a boycott in 1980 virtually guaranteed 
that this measure would aggravate - and prolong - conflict between the blocs”). 
23 Critics, among others, focused on the significant adverse impact of the grain 
embargo on U.S. farmers.  The embargo caused rapid decline of export sales and 
the loss of Soviet grain market, which was captured by rivaling grain exporters 
from Argentina, Canada and other countries.  See, e.g., BARRY E. CARTER, 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: IMPROVING THE HAPHAZARD U.S. REGIME 29, 
70-72 (1988); MOYER & MABRY, supra note 21 at 48-52; ROGER B. PORTER, THE U.S.-
U.S.S.R. GRAIN AGREEMENT 134-137 (1984); Robert l. Paarlberg, Lessons of the Grain 
Embargo, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 144, 144-162 (1980-1981). 
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Trans-Siberian pipeline embargo of 1981-1982.  Initially imposed as 
an additional element of a complex sanction campaign directed at 
Poland in response to the declaration of martial law, those measures 
were aimed at hampering Soviet construction of Yamal natural-gas 
pipeline, which would allow the Soviet Union to transport natural 
gas form the Urengoi gas field in Siberia to Western Europe.  It 
provided expanded export control over oil and gas equipment and 
technology supplies from the United States and European countries. 
That large-scale project of energy cooperation with the Soviet Union 
raised a serious concern for the Reagan administration about 
dangerous potential dependency of European countries on Soviet 
energy sources, which could provide the Soviet Union with 
potential leverage over U.S. allies in Europe.24 Exterritorial 
applicability of that initiative was met with strong opposition by 
European governments and companies that continued to deliver 
controlled pipeline equipment to the Soviet Union in spite of 
enforcement actions launched by U.S. authorities.25  The shoot down 
of Korean Airline Flight 007 by the Soviet air force in 1983 caused 
the imposition of short-time air transportation sanction against the 
Soviet Union.26 
In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev, the last General Secretary of the 
Communist Party, launched liberalizing reforms and reconsidered 
Soviet foreign policy, focusing on reducing tensions, which led to 
the end of the Cold War.  In the same year, he proposed that the two 
countries abolish mutual trade restrictions and expand bilateral 
economic cooperation as an alternative to unavailing 
confrontation.27  
                                                     
24 See generally Moyer & Mabry, supra note 21, at 67-73, 88-91; George E. 
Shambaugh, State, Firms, and Power: Successful Sanctions in United States Foreign 
Policy 71-103 (1999).  See also Hufbauer & Schott, supra note 14, at 696-703 
(providing a chronology of events and a list of pursued goals). 
25 For a discussion of the reasons and consequences of the intra-alliance 
conflict over the Trans-Siberian pipeline embargo; see, e.g., CLAUS HOFHANSEL, 
COMMERCIAL COMPETITION AND NATIONAL SECURITY: COMPARING U.S. AND GERMAN 
EXPORT CONTROL POLICIES 176-187 (1996); MARTIN, supra note 20, at 207-234; 
MASTANDUNO, supra note 14, at 247-264; Edward L. Rubinoff, Export of Oil and Gas 
Equipment and Technology to the Soviet Union: A Case Study in The Use of Export Control 
as Instruments of U.S. Foreign Policy in LAW AND POLICY OF EXPORT CONTROLS: RECENT 
ESSAYS ON KEY EXPORT ISSUES 417, 419-429 (Homer E. Moyer, Jr. et al. eds., 1993). 
26 See HUFBAUER & SCHOTT; supra note 14, at 738-740 (providing a chronology 
of events and a list of pursued goals). 
27 See Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Remarks on US-USSR Trade, HARV. BUS. REV., May-
June 1986, at 55, 56-57. Gorbachev resumed the following: 
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2.2. From the Cold War to the Cold Peace  
 
In the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union, the move of 
Russia and other former Soviet republics towards democracy and 
market economies, and their further integration to the world 
economy and Western political structures triggered not only the 
rapid growth of bilateral trade and investment, but also 
development of the U.S.-Russia partnership in such areas as defense 
and security, nuclear nonproliferation and environmental 
protection.28  It, consequently, resulted in the disappearance of the 
rationale of archaic Cold War economic restrictions on international 
and national levels.  
In 1993, President Clinton initiated the repeal of obstacles 
affecting normal relations with the states of the former Soviet Union, 
including the so-called Friendship Act29 that lifted major statutory 
trade restrictions on Russia.30  Although some old-fashioned 
restrictions remained in place,31 their potential negative effect on 
bilateral economic cooperation was offset by the generally 
permissive practice of their enforcement with respect to Russian 
business.32  On March 13, 1994, the members of CoCom announced 
its termination and started the negotiation of the successor 
                                                     
Both of us will survive without each other, particularly since there is no 
lack of trade partners in the world today.  But is it normal from a political 
standpoint?  My answer is definitely and emphatically no.  In our 
dangerous world we simply cannot afford to neglect . . . such stabilizing 
factors in relations as trade and economic, scientific and economic ties.  If 
we are to have genuinely stable and enduring relations capable of 
ensuring a lasting peace, they should be based, among other things, on 
well-developed business relations.   
Id. at 56. 
28 See Vancouver Declaration: Joint Statement of the Presidents of the United 
States and the Russian Federation, April 4, 1993, available at http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/WCPD-1993-04-12/pdf/WCPD-1993-04-12-Pg545.pdf.  
29 Act for Reform in Emerging New Democracies and Support and Help for 
Improved Partnership with Russia, Ukraine and Other New Independent States, 
107 Stat. 2317, 103 P.L. 199, 107 Stat. 2317. 
30 Id. Sections 201-204. 
31 See, e.g., Cowan, supra note 5, at 744-748 (reviewing the modification of U.S. 
laws and policies regarding trade with the Soviet Union other than Jackson-Vanik).  
32 See Aleksandr Mekhanik & Alekseĭ Khazbiev, Tekhnologii na linii fronta 
[Technologies on Front Line], EXPERT, Sept. 22, 2014 (Russ.), http://expert.ru/expert/ 
2014/39/tehnologii-na-linii-fronta/ (describing the loose control over U.S. 
technology exports to Russia in recent decades). 
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institution for the purposes of international coordination of dual-use 
export control with the participation of former East-block 
countries.33 During the same time period, the Russian government 
continued negotiations with U.S. officials to obtain the most favored 
nation trade status and applied to join the most respectable 
international institutions, including the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade.34  The Jackson-Vanik Amendment became a 
principal barrier for Russia to achieve those objectives.  
It is, however, quite notable that although sometimes East-West 
relations in 1990s-2000s were far from rosy, the mutual interest of 
both countries in obtaining the benefits form collaboration on the 
international arena always prevailed over all potentially conflicting 
situations – including NATO expansion (1999, 2004, and 2009), the 
wars in Yugoslavia (1995 and 1998), Chechnya (1994 and 1999), 
Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), and Georgia (2008) – which hardly 
affected bilateral economic and political ties.  For example, 
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and 
Pentagon, President Putin was the first foreign leader who 
expressed support and solidarity to the American people,35 and 
Russia even provided support to U.S. military operations in 
Afghanistan.36 
 
2.3. Magnitsky Act and U.S. response to the Ukraine Crisis 
 
                                                     
33 See Michael Lipson, The Wassenaar Arrangement: Transparency and Restraint 
trough Trans-Governmental Cooperation? in NON-PROLIFERATION EXPORT CONTROLS: 
ORIGINS, CHALLENGES, AND PROPOSALS FOR STRENGTHENING 49, 50-53 (Daniel Joyner 
ed., 2006) (overviewing the process of CoCom dissolution and its replacement by 
other international export control arrangements).  
34 For a general analysis of Russian post-Soviet foreign policy, see Robert H. 
Donaldson, Boris Yeltsin's Foreign Policy Legacy, 7 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 285 (2000) 
(describing the key challenges of U.S.-Russia relations and the main objectives of 
Russia’s foreign policy between 1992 and 1999). 
35 On September 13, 2001, Russia held a moment of silence to honor the 
9/11 victims throughout its territory.  See Press Release, President Vladimir Putin 
signed a decree declaring a minute of silence as a gesture of mourning over the 
tragic consequences of the terrorist acts in the United States of America (Sept. 12, 
2001, 12:50), http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/15213. 
36 See, e.g., NATO-Russia practical cooperation (Dec. 2013), http://www.nato. 
int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2013_12/20131127_131201-MediaBackgrounder-
NRC_en.pdf. 
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After nineteen years of multilateral negotiations, aimed at 
Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), Russia 
became a member of the WTO in August 2012.37  In order to obtain 
full free-trade advantage for U.S. business38 the Obama 
administration requested that Congress grant extension of 
permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) to Russia and, 
consequently, end the application of the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment.39  
The passage of the PNTR bill caused heated debates in Congress 
and resulted in a compromise with lawmakers who backed the 
pairing of the bill with a system of economic sanctions designed to 
penalize persons responsible for corruption and human-rights 
violations in Russia.40  That legislation also named as the Magnitsky 
                                                     
37 See Press Release, World Trade Org., WTO Membership Rises to 157 with 
the Entry of Russia and Vanuatu (Aug. 22, 2012), available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/news_e/pres12_e/pr671_e.htm (quoting a statement by WTO Director-
General Pascal Lamy, welcoming Russia as the 156th WTO member).  
38 See generally U.S. Export Opportunities From Russia's Membership in the WTO, 
http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/russia-and-            
eurasia/russia-0. See also Andrew E. Kramer, U.S. Companies Worry About Effect of 
Russia Joining W.T.O., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2012, (discussing the potential benefits 
of granting Russia permanent normal trade relations to U.S. companies). 
39 H.R. Rep. No. 112-632 (2012), reprinted in 2012 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683, 2012 WL 
3139857. Russia’s officials blamed William F. Browder, the CEO and co-founder of 
the investment fund Hermitage Capital Management, who was previously accused 
by Russian tax service of large-scale tax evasion, for lobbing the Magnitsky Act. See 
Interview with Sergey Lavrov, the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, in 
RTVI (Apr. 11, 2013, 02:03 PM), available at http://russian.rt.com/article/7130.  See 
also William Browder, Tortured to Death by Putin's Jackboot State: Inside the Rat-
infested Gestapo-like Russian Prison Where Eight Guards Beat Lawyer Who Exposed 
Moscow's Gangster Regime, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 3, 2012, 17:00 EST), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2227309/Tortured-death-Putins-
jackboot-state-Last-words-Moscow-lawyer-death-screams--chilling-truth-Russias-
terrifying-gangster-regime.html.  
40 See generally Vicki Needham, Senators, Obama Administration Aim for 
Compromise on Russia Trade, THE HILL (Jun. 21, 2012, 06:02 PM), 
http://thehill.com/policy/finance/234173-senators-obama-administration-aim-
for-compromise-on-russia-trade (explaining a background of the discussion and 
the reasons of the administration and lawmakers to link the two bills); Andrew 
Baskin & Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Blacklists Russian Officials Linked to Human Rights 
Violations, 27 No. 10 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 918 (2012) (“[b]alancing . . . concerns 
[over close cooperation with Russia on Iran, Israel and Palestine, and the Arctic, as 
well as other substantive issues ranging from cybercrime to counter-terrorism to 
nuclear proliferation] while simultaneously attempting to maintain credibility on 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and simultaneously handling an 
uncooperative and impatient Congress, will be a significant test for the Obama 
administration”). 
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Rule of Law Accountability Act or the Magnitsky Act41 was 
proposed by Senator Ben Cardin in 201142 in response to the tragic 
death at Moscow’s notorious Matrosskaya Tishina prison of Sergei 
Magnitsky, an auditor who was imprisoned after accusing a group 
of Russian officials of tax fraud and theft.43  
The Magnitsky Act also identifies other violations of human 
rights in Russia including 
murders of Nustap Abdurakhmanov, Maksharip Aushev, 
Natalya Estemirova, Akhmed Hadjimagomedov, Umar 
Israilov, Paul Klebnikov, Anna Politkovskaya, Saihadji 
Saihadjiev, and Magomed Y. Yevloyev, the death in custody 
of Vera Trifonova, the disappearances of Mokhmadsalakh 
Masaev and Said-Saleh Ibragimov, the torture of Ali Israilov 
and Islam Umarpashaev, the near-fatal beatings of Mikhail 
Beketov, Oleg Kashin, Arkadiy Lander, and Mikhail 
Vinyukov, and the harsh and ongoing imprisonment of 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Alexei Kozlov, Platon Lebedev, and 
Fyodor Mikheev44  
and empowers the President to determine persons responsible or 
otherwise related to the death of Sergei Magnitsky or other 
violations of internationally recognized human rights” to forbid 
them to enter the United States, and “freeze and prohibit all 
transactions in all property and interests in property of [such] 
                                                     
41 Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule Of 
Law Accountability Act of 2012 § 401-407, Pub. L. No. 112-208, 126 Stat. 1496 (2012). 
42 S. 1039, 112th Cong. § 1 (2011).  
43 See generally President of Russia’s Council on Civil Society and Human 
Rights, Predvaritel’noe Zakluchenie Rabochei Gruppy po Izucheniiu Obstoiatel’stv Gibeli 
Sergeia Magnitskogo ot 04 iiulia 2011 [Preliminary Conclusion of the Working Group on 
the Study of Circumstances of Sergey Magnitsky’s Death of July 4, 2011] (Russ.), available 
at http://president-sovet.ru/documents/read/59/; The Public Oversight 
Commission of the City of Moscow for the Control of the Observance of Human 
Rights in Places of Forced Detention, Otchet o Proverke Soderzhaniia S.L. Magnitskogo 
v SIZO g. Moskvy [Review of the Conditions of the Detention of Sergei Magnitsky in the 
Pre-Trial Detention Centers of the City of Moscow] (Dec. 12, 2010, 02:20 PM) (Russ.), 
http://onk-moskva.hrworld.ru/news_onk/otchiet-obshchiestviennoi-
nabliudatiel-noi-komissii-ghmoskva; Council of Europe. Parliamentary Assembly, 
Allegations of Politically-motivated Abuses of the Criminal Justice System in Council of 
Europe Member States (Aug. 7, 2009), available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a9b8f1b2.html.  
44 Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of 
Law Accountability Act of 2012 § 402(a)(15). 
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person[s].”45  The unclassified part of the Magnitsky sanction list, 
which initially included 18 individuals implicated in the death of 
Sergei Magnitsky and other alleged human rights abuses,46 was 
extended twice: to 30 people in May47 and to 34 people in December 
2014.48 
A second wave of contemporary sanctions against the Russian 
Federation was triggered by the Ukraine crisis of 2013-2014, and 
Russia’s subsequent actions in Crimea and the Donbass region.49  On 
March 6, 2014, President Obama signed Executive Order 
13660, placing targeted sanctions including a U.S. travel ban and the 
asset freeze against individuals and entities responsible for 
“undermin[ing] democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine,” 
and “threaten[ing] its peace, security, stability, sovereignty, and 
territorial integrity;”50 further, the sanctions imposed pursuant to 
Executive Order 13660 on former President of Ukraine Viktor 
Yanukovych, Crimea-based separatist leaders, and other former 
Ukrainian officials 51 was expanded by Executive Order 13661 of 
March 17, 2014 to cover certain Russian lawmakers and officials,52 
and to made it clear that the United States’ next steps would be 
“based on whether Russia chooses to escalate or to de-escalate the 
situation.”53  Three days later, in response to the continuing actions 
of Russian Government, “including its purported annexation of 
                                                     
45 Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of 
Law Accountability Act of 2012 § 404-406. 
46 OFAC, Magnitsky Sanctions Listings (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.treasury. 
gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20130412.aspx. 
47 OFAC, Magnitsky Sanctions Designations (May 20, 2014), 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-
Enforcement/Pages/20140520.aspx. 
48 OFAC, Magnitsky-related Designations (Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.          
treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20141229. 
aspx.  
49 See generally Press Release, Statement by the President on Ukraine (Feb. 28, 
2014, 5:05 PM EST), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/02/28/ 
statement-president-ukraine.  
50 Exec. Order No. 13660 3 C.F.R. (2014). 
51 OFAC, Issuance of a new Ukraine-related Executive Order; Ukraine-related 
Designations (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/                 
sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/pages/20140317.aspx. 
52 Exec. Order No. 13661 3 C.F.R. (2014). 
53 Press Release, Statement by the President on Ukraine (Mar. 17, 2014, 10:45 
AM EDT), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/17/statement-
president-ukraine. 
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Crimea and its use of force in Ukraine,” a new Executive order 
“Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the 
Situation in Ukraine” expanded the scope of the national emergency 
declared in previous executive orders.54  
In view of the development of the conflict in Ukraine, the 
provisions of Executive Orders 13660, 13661 and 13662 were 
included inter alia into the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, 
Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014.55  To 
increase economic pressure on Russia, the list of the persons 
targeted by U.S. sanctions was expanded several times to politicians 
and businessmen in Putin’s inner circle, Crimean officials, the 
leaders of the separatist movement in Donbass, Donetsk and 
Luhansk People’s Republics, and even a motorcycle club, as well as 
Russian largest banks, defense and energy companies.56  In addition 
to targeted sanctions deployed against designated individuals, 
companies, and the sectors of the Russian economy, on December 
19, 2014, the United States announced the placement of a 
                                                     
54 Exec. Order No. 13662 3 C.F.R. (2014). The Executive Order 13662 provided 
ability to impose sanctions targeting certain sectors of Russian economy that may 
be chosen by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of 
State (e.g., financial services, energy, metals and mining, engineering, and defense 
and related materiel).  Simultaneously, the Office of Foreign Assets Control 
announced a significant extension of the Specially Designated Nationals List related 
to the Ukrainian crisis. See OFAC, Ukraine-related Designations (Mar. 20, 2014), 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/ 
pages/20140320_33.aspx. 
55 Support for the Sovereignty Integrity Democracy and Economic Stability of 
Ukraine Act of 2014 § 8-9, Pub. L. No. 113-95, 128 Stat. 1088 (2014). 
56 OFAC, Ukraine-related Designations (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.           
treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/pages/          
20140411.aspx; OFAC, Ukraine-related Designations (Apr. 28, 2014), 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-
Enforcement/pages/20140411.aspx; OFAC, Ukraine-related Designations (June. 
20, 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-
Enforcement/ Pages/20140619_33.aspx; OFAC, Ukraine-related Sanctions; 
Publication of Executive Order 13662 Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List (July 
16, 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-
Enforcement/ Pages/20140716.aspx; OFAC, Sectoral Sanctions Identifications; 
Kingpin Act Designations; Iran Designations Update; Ukraine-related Designation 
(July, 29, 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-
Enforcement/ Pages/20140729.aspx; OFAC, Ukraine-related Sanctions (Sept. 12, 
2014), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-
Enforcement/ Pages/20140912.aspx; OFAC, Issuance of a new Ukraine-related 
Executive Order and General License; Ukraine-related Designations (Dec. 19, 2014), 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/ 
Pages/20141219.aspx. 
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comprehensive economic embargo on “the Crimea region of 
Ukraine” which included almost all economic interactions between 
the United States and Crimea.57  The U.S. President also signed into 
law the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 201458 that gives “the 
Administration additional authorities that could be utilized, if 
circumstances warranted,”59 to deploy further sanctions targeting 
financial, defense and energy sectors of Russian economy, and to 
place additional licensing restriction on U.S. export and re-export to 
Russia.60  
The situations with economic sanctions placed on the Soviet 
Union in the 1970s and 1980s and the two current sanction 
campaigns against the Russian Federation have some similarities.  
The most remarkable of them is obvious parallels between factual 
backgrounds of events triggering the U.S. reaction:  human rights 
abuses (i.e., the arrests of dissidents in the Soviet Union, and the 
death of Sergei Magnitsky in Moscow’s prison following his arrest), 
and alleged violations of international law (i.e., the bringing of 
Soviet troops into Afghanistan and Russia’s actions in Ukraine, and 
the tragic downing of Korean Airline Flight 007 in 1983 and 
Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 in 2014).  The major difference is that the 
Ukraine-related sanctions are more complex and rigorous than 
measures the United States had ever put in place against the Soviet 
Union.61  Nevertheless, unlike the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and 
other hardly irreversible Cold War restrictions, the contemporary 
                                                     
57 Exec. Order No. 13685 79 Fed. Reg. 77357 (Dec. 19, 2014). See also OFAC, 
General License No. 4 of Dec. 19, 2014 (Authorizing the Exportation or 
Reexportation of Agricultural Commodities, Medicine, Medical Supplies, and 
Replacement Parts), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/        
sanctions/Programs/Documents/ukraine_gl4.pdf; OFAC, General License No. 5 
of Dec. 30, 2014 (Authorizing Certain Activities Prohibited by Executive Order 
13685 of Dec. 19, 2014 Necessary to Wind Down Operations Involving the Crimea 
Region of Ukraine), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/ukraine_gl5.pdf. 
58 The Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014, Pub. L. No.  113-272, 128 Stat. 
2952 (2014). 
59 Press Release, Statement by the President on the Ukraine Freedom Support 
Act (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/18/ 
statement-president-ukraine-freedom-support-act. 
60 In 2014, the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security 
several times tightened up U.S. export control restrictions aimed at Russia’s 
defense, oil and gas, and energy sectors. See, e.g., The Export Administration 
Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §744, §746.5 (2014). 
61 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.  
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targeted sanction policy of the United States tends to be more 
flexible, and, consequently, potentially more effective,62 because it 
aims not so much to penalize an adversary country, its nationals and 
companies, as to use a “carrot and stick” approach to coerce a 
targeted state to change its behavior or to follow internationally 
recognized standards and rules.  Accordingly, the defined goal of 
the of Ukraine-related sanctions is “to promote a diplomatic 
solution that provides a lasting resolution to the conflict and helps 
to promote growth and stability in Ukraine and regionally, 
including in Russia,” which is obliged to lead somehow “to 
implement the Minsk agreements and to reach a lasting and 
comprehensive resolution to the conflict which respects Ukraine’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity,” and the United States affirmed 
its readiness to “roll back sanctions should Russia take the necessary 
steps.”63 
Another important difference is broader international support 
for contemporary U.S. economic measures against Russia provided 
by Europe and other U.S. allies,64 as a direct result of U.S. political 
and diplomatic efforts and, perhaps, some political coercion.65  
                                                     
62 It is, however, important to note that it would be a mistake to overestimate 
an efficiency of new types of economic sanctions employed against Russia that 
aiming at its ability to refinance an external debt, and to develop key industries. 
According to Eric B. Lorber, like with more traditional sanctions, it still is extremely 
difficult to fully understand and predict the effects of such sanctions, and utilize 
them for policy impact. See Eric B. Lorber, A New and Improved Sanction? Or the Same 
Old Story? CATO UNBOUND (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.cato-unbound.org/2014/ 
11/12/eric-b-lorber/new-improved-sanction-or-same-old-story. 
63 Supra note 59. 
64 See, e.g., Press Release, G-7 Leaders Statement on Ukraine (Apr. 25, 2014), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/25/g-7-leaders-
statement-ukraine (“We, the leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, the President of the European Council and the 
President of the European Commission . . . now agreed that we will move swiftly 
to impose additional sanctions on Russia”).  
65 Vice President Joseph Biden stated that “they did not want to do that.  But 
again, it was America’s leadership and the President of the United States insisting, 
oft times almost having to embarrass Europe to stand up and take economic hits to 
impose costs.” Joseph R. Biden Jr., the Vice President of the United States, Remarks 
at the John F. Kennedy Forum, Harvard Kennedy School, Boston, Massachusetts 
(Oct. 2, 2014), available at http://forum.iop.harvard.edu/content/vice-president-
biden-deliver-remarks-foreign-policy (transcript also available at http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/10/03/remarks-vice-president-john-f-
kennedy-forum).  
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Furthermore, along with the EU’s economic66 and diplomatic67 
measures, similar economic restrictions were adopted by a number 
of non-EU countries including, amongst others, Norway,68 
Switzerland,69 and Ukraine.70  Although a significant number of 
sanctioning countries do not guarantee the success of economic 
sanctions,71 the coalition between the United States and the 
European Union, whose member states have more intensive trade 
relations with the targeted nation,72 significantly increases the cost 
of sanctions for Russia. 
 
                                                     
66 The EU determined a list of individuals who would be subject to travel bans 
and whose assets would be subject to a freeze within EU territory, placed an 
economic embargo against Crimea and Sevastopol, and implemented a number of 
measures targeting sectoral cooperation and exchanges with Russia including 
limited access to EU capital markets, arms embargo, and curtail access to sensitive 
technologies.  See EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine crisis, 
http://europa.eu/ newsroom/highlights/special-
coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm#2 (last visited Jan. 4, 2015). 
67 The EU cancelled the 2014 EU-Russia summit, announced the decision of EU 
members not to hold regular bilateral summits with Russia's participation, and 
suspended talks with Russia on visa matters as well as on the New Agreement 
between the EU and Russia.  See id. 
68 See generally Press Release, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, 
Norway to implement new restrictive measures against Russia (Aug. 11, 2014), 
https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/Norway-to-implement-new-restrictive-
measures-against-Russia/id765675/.  
69 See generally Press Release, the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic 
Affairs, Ukraine: Measures to prevent the circumvention of international sanctions 
(Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.seco.admin.ch/aktuell/00277/01164/01980/                   
index.html?lang=en&msg-id=52530.  
70 See generally Press Release, the Government of Ukraine, Gov't approved 
propositions to the NSDC regarding personal sanctions as result of Russian 
aggression (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/en/publish/article? 
art_id=247598425&cat_id=244314975.  
71 See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 172 
(3rd ed. 2009) (arguing that “the greater the number of countries needed to 
implement sanctions and the longer the sanctions run, the greater the difficulty of 
sustaining an effective coalition”). See also Daniel W. Drezner, Bargaining, 
Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?, 54 
INT’L ORG. 73 (2000) (discussing why international cooperation and the success of 
economic sanctions are not correlated). 
72 For instance, Russia was the third largest trade partner of the EU in 2013. See 
European Commission, Directorate General for Trade, Client and Supplier 
Countries of the EU28 in Merchandise Trade (value %) (2013, excluding intra-EU 
trade) available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/ 
tradoc_ 122530.pdf.  
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3.  THE LEGALITY OF UNILATERAL SANCTIONS: DEBATES AND THE 
U.S. JUSTIFICATION 
 
There is no clear consensus in the international community as to 
the existence of an international norm prohibiting the unilateral use 
of economic sanctions.  This Part examines a variety of academic 
views on the legality of such economic measures and then considers 
both the evolution of the U.S. arguments on the legitimacy of its 
sanction policy and the current U.S. sanction practice. 
 
3.1. The Lack of International Legal Standards for Unilateral Sanctions 
 
The deployment of economic sanctions against a sovereign state 
without authorization from the Security Council raises a serious 
question regarding the legality of U.S. unilateral coercive measures 
under international law, and their compliance with the rules of the 
international trade system.  Addressing arguments that support the 
existence of legal limitations on a state’s right to impose economic 
sanctions against another state will allow us to consider the United 
States’ legal justification of its contemporary sanction practice as 
further discussed below. 
 
3.1.1. The U.N. Charter and Customary International Law 
 
While Article 41 of the U.N. Charter permits the use of collective 
economic sanctions by the international community, it states that the 
Security Council is the only body authorized to determine a “threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,”73 and to 
decide what responsive coercive measures should be applied to a 
violating member of the United Nations.74  Since the end of the Cold 
                                                     
73 U.N. Charter art. 35. 
74 U.N. Charter art. 41. Article 41 provides that: 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of 
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may 
call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. 
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations 
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. 
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War, the Security Council has played a proactive role on the 
international scene deploying mandatory U.N. sanctions to put 
diplomatic and economic pressure on targeted states or non-state 
actors for breach of fundamental principles of international law, 
including the prohibition of aggression, terrorism, the violations of 
human rights and humanitarian law.75 
The U.N. Charter does not, however, contain any explicit 
reference to unilateral economic measures that states may use 
against each other without the authorization of the Security Council.  
The unilateral use of coercive measures raises a question of whether 
unilateral economic sanctions may be interpreted as a use of force 
against sovereign nations prohibited under Article 2(4) of the U.N. 
Charter,76 or an unlawful intervention in “matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction”77 of targeted states.  
Although many critics ague that such nonmilitary coercive actions 
should be considered illegal from an international law perspective,78 
                                                     
75 See, e.g., Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Sanctions Regimes under Article 41 of the UN 
Charter, in NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2004) 6-18 (overviewing key post-
1990 sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council under Article 41 of the UN 
Charter).  
76 Article 2(4) states that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes 
of the United Nations.” 
77 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. While the principle of non-intervention is not 
specified in the UN Charter, the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. 
United States defined it as a principle of customary international law prohibiting 
states from directly or indirectly intervening in the internal or external affairs of 
other states. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 108 (June 27), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/ 
docket/files/70/6503.pdf. 
78 See, e.g., George N. Barrie, International Law and Economic Coercion - A Legal 
Assessment, 11 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 40, 53 (1985-1986) (constituting economic coercion 
without authorization of the Security Counsel as a violation of non-intervention 
rule); Yehuda Z. Blum, Economic Boycotts in International Law, 12 TEX. INT'L L. J. 5, 15 
(1977) (“[e]ven if boycotts . . . do not amount to a use of force prohibited under 
article 2(4) of the UN Charter, most of them certainly constitute a violation of the 
rule of nonintervention into the domestic matters of another sovereign state, with 
a view to influencing their foreign or domestic policy in an unjustifiable manner”); 
Derek W. Bowett, International Law and Economic Coercion, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 245, 246-
254 (1976) (noting that economic coercion should be regulated rather by the duty of 
non-intervention than by Article 2(4), and suggesting three legitimate exceptions to 
the prohibition of economic coercion: (1) economic measures taken in self-defense; 
(2) economic measures of reprisal; (3) economic sanctions authorized by a 
competent organ of the international community); Hartmut Brosche, The Arab Oil 
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the majority of Western commentators do not support the 
contention that the U.N. Charter and customary international law 
expressly bars states from using economic measures or the broad 
definition of force that includes economic coercion.79  Even though 
the aforementioned question is still a subject of academic disputes, 
developing countries’ position that unilateral economic measures 
violate the U.N. Charter and the customary international law 
principle of nonintervention is becoming broadly recognized by 
many states and international organizations, and can be seen in 
many resolutions of the General Assembly.80  Hence, in the 
                                                     
Embargo and United States Pressure Against Chile: Economic and Political Coercion and 
the Charter of the United Nations, 7 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 3, 34 (1974) (emphasizing 
a trend towards a broader interpretation of the prohibition of the threat or use of 
force as formulated in Article 2(4) that includes the measures of an economic and 
political character); Cassandra LaRae-Perez, Economic Sanctions as a Use of Force: 
Reevaluating the Legality of Sanctions from an Effects-Based Perspective, 20 B.U. INT'L L.J. 
161, 188 (2002) (“[p]arties that impose unilateral sanctions should be as answerable 
or their actions as they would be if they had attacked a sovereign nation with 
arms”); David J. Santeusanio, Extraterritoriality and Secondary Boycotts: A Critical and 
Legal Analysis of United States Foreign Policy, 21 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 367, 375-
379 (1998) (arguing that economic coercion via primary boycott rarely, and via 
secondary boycott almost always violate international law). 
79 See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic 
Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 50-52 (2001) (concluding that Article 2(4) is expressly 
limited to threat or use of military force, Article 2(7) is limited to action by the UN, 
and “no international consensus has emerged to support the contrary position”); J. 
Curtis Henderson, Legality Of Economic Sanctions Under International Law: The Case 
Of Nicaragua, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167, 180-181 (1986) (discussing the issue 
whether sanctions against Nicaragua violates Article 2(4), and noting that the 
majority view is that the scope of force does not include economic coercion); See also 
Richard D. Porotsky, Economic Coercion and the General Assembly: A Post-Cold War 
Assessment of the Legality and Utility of the Thirty-Five-Year Old Embargo against Cuba, 
28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 901, 920 (1995) (“the Charter's 1945 travaux preparatoires 
clearly demonstrate that Article 2(4) was not intended to apply to economic force”). 
Porotsky also argues that the International Court of Justice justified the propriety 
of the U.S. embargo of Nicaragua under customary international law in the 1986 
notorious case Nicaragua v. United States.  See id. at 919.  But some authors, by 
contrast, challenges the Arab oil embargo against the United States on the ground 
that those economic measures violated Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.  See generally 
Jordan J. Paust & Albert P. Blaustein, The Arab Oil Weapon - A Threat to International 
Peace, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 410 (1974); Brosche supra note 78. 
80 See G.A. Res. 44/215, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/215 (Dec. 22, 1989); G.A. Res. 
46/210, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/210 (Dec. 20, 1991); G.A. Res. 48/168, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/48/168 (Dec. 21, 1993); G.A. Res. 50/96, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/96 (Dec. 20, 
1995); G.A. Res. 52/181, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/181 (Dec. 18, 1997); G.A. Res. 54/200, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/200 (Dec. 22, 1999); G.A. Res. 56/179, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/56/179 (Dec. 21, 2001); G.A. Res. 58/198, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/198 (Dec. 
23, 2003); G.A. Res. 60/185, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/185 (Dec. 22, 2005); G.A. Res. 
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Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States, the majority of U.N. 
member states affirmed that “no State may use or encourage the use 
of unilateral economic, political or any other type of measures to 
coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of 
the exercise of its sovereign rights unilateral economic sanctions 
violate the sovereignty of the target.”81  A similar provision was 
contained in the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States,82 and in the Charter of the Organization of American States.83  
Even if the binding status of the General Assembly’s resolutions is a 
debatable issue, the 40-year history of periodic acknowledgements 
                                                     
62/183, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/183 (Dec. 19, 2007); G.A. Res. 64/189, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/64/189 (Dec. 21, 2009); G.A. Res. 66/186, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/186 (Dec. 
22, 2011); G.A. Res. 68/200, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/200 (Dec. 20, 2013). The 
resolutions repeat the almost identical statement urging “the international 
community to adopt urgent and effective measures to eliminate the use of unilateral 
coercive economic measures against developing countries that are not authorized 
by relevant organs of the United Nations or are inconsistent with the principles of 
international law as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and that 
contravene the basic principles of the multilateral trading system.”  G.A. Res. 
68/200. 
81 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625(XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
This statement evolved from the formulation of the 1965 Declaration on the 
Inadmissibility of Intervention, which provides that “[n]o State may use or 
encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce 
another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its 
sovereign rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind.”  Declaration on the 
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection 
of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131(XX), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/20/2131 (Dec. 21, 1965). 
82 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281(XXIX), U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/29/3281 (Dec. 12, 1974).  Article 32 declares that “[n]o State may use 
or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce 
another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its 
sovereign rights.” 
83 O.A.S. Charter art. 19-20. The articles provide the following: 
Article 19. No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly 
or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of 
any other State.  The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force 
but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the 
personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural 
elements. 
Article 20. No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of 
an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of 
another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss1/7
  
2015]  “MEMORY EFFECT” OF SANCTIONS 377 
 
by international community of the impermissibility of unilateral 
economic coercive measures deserves to be considered as a global 
tendency toward the gradual formation of a new international 
custom (lex ferenda).84  
3.1.2. Compliance with WTO Principles 
 
Since the adoption of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)85 in 1947, it was designed to liberalize trade by virtue of the 
reduction of trade barriers and the elimination of discrimination in 
international commerce.  Articles I and III of the GATT provide the 
most-favored-nation and national treatments to all contracting 
states prohibiting the use of discriminatory measures in 
international trade.  Article XI (1) states more specific rule that the 
WTO member may not place restrictions other than duties, taxes or 
other charges on international trade.86  Consequently, economic 
measures employing trade restrictions may be considered to be in 
contradiction with the values and principles of a free trade system.87  
Historically, there were a number of attempts to examine U.S. 
economic sanctions that allegedly violated the GATT/WTO 
principles including, for instance, the following: in 1949, 
Czechoslovakia filed a complaint against the United States for its 
export licensing controls;88 in 1984 and 1985, Nicaragua brought the 
                                                     
84 See generally Richard B. Lillich, Economic Coercion and the “New International 
Legal Order”: A Second Look at Some First Impressions, in ECONOMIC COERCION AND 
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 105, 111-112 (Richard B. Lillich ed. 1976).  
85 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
86 Article XI(1) of the GATT provides: 
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, 
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other 
measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on 
the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting 
party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for 
the territory of any other contracting party. 
87 See generally Maarten Smeets, Conflicting Goals: Economic Sanctions and the 
WTO, GLOBAL DIALOGUE, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Summer 2000), 
http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=100. 
88 Czechoslovakia requested a decision under Article XXIII of the GATT as to 
whether U.S. prevention of certain exports to Czechoslovakia violated its 
obligations under the GATT.  See Panel Report, Summary Record of the Twenty-Second 
Meeting, CP.3/SR22 (June 8, 1949), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_ e/dispu_e/49expres.pdf. 
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actions in the GATT Council to challenge trade sanctions and later 
total trade embargo imposed by the United States;89 in 1996, the 
European Communities requested consultations with the United 
States concerning Helms Burton law;90 in 1997, the European 
Communities filed a complaint in respect of Massachusetts 
government procurement measures relating to state contracts with 
companies doing business with Burma (Myanmar).91  Those 
disputes, however, left unresolved the issue of whether or not U.S. 
economic sanctions might be justified as legitimate trade 
restrictions, but pointed out the argumentation of the disputing 
parties regarding permissible exceptions from the GATT restraints.  
For example, in the 1986 Panel Report regarding U.S. trade measures 
affecting Nicaragua, the GATT panel held that it had no authority to 
examine U.S. justification of Article XXI invocation.92  Article XXI 
provides:  
Security Exceptions 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
                                                     
89 Nicaragua requested the panel to find that U.S. restrictions to imports of 
sugar and the later prohibition of imports and exports of good between the United 
States and Nicaragua violated the provisions of the GATT.  See Report of the Panel, 
United States – Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua, L/5607 (Mar. 13, 1984), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/83sugar.pdf; and Report of the 
Panel, United States – Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, L/6053 (Oct. 13, 1986), 
available at http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91240197.pdf. 
90 In that case, the EC alleged that U.S. trade restrictions and travel ban are 
inconsistent with the U.S. commitments under the GATT and GATS.  See Request 
for Consultations by the European Communities, United States - The Cuban Liberty 
and Democratic Solidarity Act, WT/DS38/1 (May 13, 1996), available at 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=(@Symb
ol=%20wt/ds38/1)&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerScriptedSearch&     
languageUIChanged=true#. 
91 The EC challenged legislation that prohibited the public authorities of 
Massachusetts to procure goods or services from any persons, who do business 
with Burma as contravening the U.S. obligations under the Government 
Procurement Agreement (GPA).  See Request for Consultations by the European 
Communities, United States - Measure Affecting Government Procurement, 
WT/DS88/1 (June 26, 1997), available at 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006. 
aspx?Query=(@Symbol=%20wt/ds88/1)&Language=ENGLISH&Context= 
FomerScriptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true#. 
92 See supra note 89. 
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(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action 
which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential 
security interests 
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from 
which they are derived; 
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and 
implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and 
materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the 
purpose of supplying a military establishment; 
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international 
relations; or 
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action 
in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations 
Charter for the maintenance of international peace and 
security.93 
Although the national security exceptions contained in Article 
XXI are criticized as being subject to states’ abuse,94 too broad,95 and 
undermining the principle objective of the WTO,96 a country’s 
essential security interest is one of the strongest and most frequent 
justifications that states utilize for the placement of trade sanctions 
on a WTO member state or its nationals.97  
Other legitimate objects of trade restriction are permitted by 
general exceptions provisions under Article XX of the GATT,98 
                                                     
93 The General Agreement on Trade in Services also contains a similar 
exception. See the General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XIV bis, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter GATS]. 
94 See generally John H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT (A Legal 
Analysis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 751-752 (1969).  
95 See generally CARTER, supra note 23, at 132-137.  
96 See generally Smeets supra note 87.  
97 See GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 554-561 
(6th ed. 1994) (describing the practice of interpretation and application of Article 
XXI). 
98 Article XX of the GATT provides: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
contracting party of measures: 
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which may, for instance, justify the imposition of economic 
sanctions for human rights violations.  If U.S. economic sanctions 
satisfy the chapeau and any of the humanitarian clarifications stated 
in this article (e.g., regarding measures necessary “to protect public 
morals”, or “to protect human . . . life or health”), they potentially 
might be considered as an exception to U.S. free trade obligations 
under the GATT/GATS.99 
Finally, the non-performance of U.S. trade obligations under the 
GATT/GATS may be also justifiable as self-help that is deemed as a 
legally permissible response to the primary violation of 
international obligations by another state.  According to the Articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, each 
countermeasure is subject to some substantive preconditions 
including among others: (1) prior violation of international 
obligations by another state;100 (2) proportionality of 
countermeasures to the gravity of the internationally wrongful 
act;101 and (3) procedurals conditions including an obligation for 
prior negotiation and necessity to proceed a dispute settlement.102 
 
                                                     
(a) necessary to protect public morals; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(e) relating to the products of prison labour. 
The resembling provision is contained in Article XIV of the GATS. 
99 See, e.g., Daniel C. K. Chow, Why China Opposes Human Rights in the World 
Trade Organization, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 61, 89-93 (2013) (discussing the WTO practice 
of trade ban justification under the GATT general exceptions provision). But see also 
Buhm Suk Baek, Economic Sanctions Against Human Rights Violations, Cornell Law 
School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference Papers, Paper 11, at 80 (2008), 
available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lps_clacp/11 (“there is not much 
possibility of economic sanctions against human rights violations to be accepted 
under Article XX, General Exceptions, in the WTO system”); Sarah H. Cleveland, 
Human Rights Sanctions and the World Trade Organisation in ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 199, 233-250 (Francesco Francioni ed., 2001) 
(reasoning why Article XX is very unattractive locus for human rights measures). 
100 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in 
Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53rd Sess., UN GAOR, 53rd Sess., Apr. 23-June 1, 
July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 
[hereinafter Articles on State Responsibility] art. 49. 
101 Articles on State Responsibility art. 51. 
102 Articles on State Responsibility art. 52. 
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3.2. The U.S. Unilateral Sanctions: Justification and Practice 
 
The practice of use of economic sanctions appeared during the 
American Revolution and “then became part of the tradition of the 
United States.”103  The U.S. government imposed economic 
sanctions against other countries “on more occasions than all other 
states [in the world] combined,”104 participating as a sender, alone 
or with others, in three-fifths of all cases over the past century.105  
However, given the above discussions about the compliance of 
unilateral sanctions with international law, how can the use of 
unilateral sanctions targeting other states be legally justified by 
scholars and U.S. officials?  
From the conventional viewpoint broadly accepted by the 
United States, foreign trade is a matter of national sovereignty, and 
there are no international law restrictions that would limit a state’s 
sovereign right to regulate its trade relations with other nations.106  
Professor Alexander points out that “states are relatively free under 
the rules of state responsibility in customary international law to 
adopt unilateral economic sanctions against states, entities and 
individuals.”107  In his 1988 study, Dr. Elagab cited the following 
opinion advocating the use of economic coercive measures 
delivered by an official of the U.S. Department of State:  
Traditional international law adopted a laissez-faire approach 
toward the economic right and duties of States, and it has 
long been considered an inherent right of an independent, 
sovereign state to exercise full control over its trade relations, 
including the withholding of export and prohibition of 
import with respect to any other state or states, absent treaty 
commitments to the contrary . . . Economic pressure may be 
unfriendly and even unfair, but economic coercion, per se, 
                                                     
103 CARTER, supra note 23, at 8. 
104 KERN ALEXANDER, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 89 (2009).  
105 See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Sanctions Sometimes Succeed: But No All-Purpose 
Cure, CATO UNBOUND (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.cato-unbound.org/2014/11/ 
07/gary-clyde-hufbauer/sanctions-sometimes-succeed-no-all-purpose-cure#_ftn4 
(overviewing success and failure sanctions episodes since 1917 to 2014). 
106 See generally J. Dapray Muir, The Boycott in International Law, in ECONOMIC 
COERCION AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 19, 26-28 (Richard B. 
Lillich ed., 1976).  
107 ALEXANDER, supra note 104, at 57. 
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cannot generally be said to be prohibited by the U.N. 
Charter.108 
On the political level, today sanctions are considered a key 
element of U.S. economic statecraft addressing foreign and 
international security challenges.109  As Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton explained in 2011: “We are committed to raising the 
economic cost of unacceptable behavior [of states that threaten 
global security or its own people] and denying the resources that 
make it possible.”110 
The United States often explains economic sanctions in terms of 
unilateral self-help acts.111  To justify unilateral sanctions as a 
permissible peacetime remedy in international law, Alexander 
divides sanctions into three categories:  (1) retortive measures, (2) 
countermeasures/reprisals and (3) punitive measures.112  He points 
out that, if a retortion that imposes economic, social or reputational 
costs against a target does not violate international legal obligation 
to the targeted state, then “for a countermeasure to be lawful under 
international law, it must be reciprocal and proportional in its aim 
and application.”113  Unless prohibited by a treaty obligation, 
punitive sanctions which include both coercive and punitive 
elements and have prominent preventing character, are generally 
                                                     
108 OMER YOUSIF ELAGAB, THE LEGALITY OF NON-FORCIBLE COUNTER-MEASURES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 202-203 (1988) (citing Digest USPIL 577 (1976)). 
109 See Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks on Economic 
Statecraft, Speach at Economic Club of New York (Oct. 14, 2011), available at 
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2011/10/ 
20111014172924su0.9650494.html#axzz3RGF1O0QA. 
110 Id. 
111 See, e.g., ELIZABETH ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS 
OF COUNTERMEASURES 8-9 (1984) (assessing the U.S. sanction legislation as a system 
of institutionalized retorsions); MALLOY, supra note 10, at 593-594 (considering 
economic sanctions as nonforcible countermeasures); Porotsky, supra note 79, at 
932-936 (discussing the evolution of the U.S. position that the Cuban embargo was 
an act of retorsion). 
112 ALEXANDER, supra note 104, at 58. In his study, Alexander considers a 
“countermeasure” referring to both reprisals and reciprocal measures. Similarly to 
the Articles of State Responsibility, his definition of the countermeasure excludes a 
retortion as an action that is generally permissible under international law 
irrespective of the prior illegal action of another state. For the purposes of this 
Article, I adopt the same mainstream definition. 
113 Id. at 86. See also ELAGAB, supra note 8 at 42-95 (defining the conditions of 
the legality of counter measures). For a discussion of the execution of self-help 
measures pursuant to international law, see, e.g., JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 676-706 (2013).  
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permitted by international law, regardless of whether a violation of 
any international legal obligation by the targeted state occurred.114  
But in many cases U.S. economic sanctions have a preventing rather 
than retaliatory character,115 and, therefore, those politically 
motivated advanced measures do not fall within retortions or 
countermeasures permitted under international law.  
Responding to the criticism of the use of unilateral economic 
sanctions as an illegitimate instrument of U.S. foreign policy, 
Lowenfeld broadens the traditional interpretation of international 
legality suggesting that sanctions should be considered through a 
prism of international law, the body of which “not, for the most part, 
based on treaty or even customary law as traditionally defined, but 
on a generally accepted principle of reasonableness.”116  But what reasons 
would be argued to justify the unilateral use of economic sanctions 
by the United States?  For example, economic sanctions are often 
considered as an alternative to military sanctions.117  According to 
some studies, recent increase in the use of economic sanctions 
resulted directly from the conscious choice by “policy elites” of 
economic sanctions as an alternative to direct military 
intervention.118 
                                                     
114 Id. at 62-63. But see ZOLLER, infra note 111, at 63 (concluding that a 
permissible coercive measure cannot be punishment). 
115 For example, the U.S. President's National Security Strategy in 2015 
provides that: 
 [i]n many cases, our use of targeted sanctions and other coercive 
measures are meant not only to uphold international norms, but to deter 
severe threats to stability and order at the regional level. We are not 
allowing the transgressors to define our regional strategies on the basis of 
the immediate threats they present. 
National Security Strategy, Feb. 2015, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf. 
116 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Sanctions and International Law: Connect or 
Disconnect, 4 HIBERNIAN L.J. 1, 2 (2003) (emphasis added). 
117 See, e.g., HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONAL LAW: UNITY WITHIN DIVERSITY 934 (4th ed. 2003).  See also supra note 
116, at 5-7 (discussing economic sanctions as an alternative to the use of force).  But 
some experts warn against reliance on this assumption in foreign affairs.  See Paul 
J. Saunders, No War with Russia? Don't Be Too Sure , THE NATIONAL INTEREST, 
Feb. 26, 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/no-war-russia-dont-be-
so-sure-10177 (discussing an erroneous opinion that economic sanctions are always 
an alternative to war rather than a prelude to it). 
118 See George A. Lopez & David Cortright, The Sanctions Era: An Alternative to 
Military Intervention, 19(2) FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS 65, 67-68 (1995) 
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Furthermore, the supporters of unilateral sanctions repeatedly 
emphasize that economic sanctions allow sending states to 
effectively meet the objectives of their foreign policy.  However, the 
views regarding the effectiveness of economic sanctions range from 
proponents’ radical views that almost all significant U.S. foreign 
policy achievements resulted from the effective use of economic 
sanctions, which had been “vital weapons in America's foreign 
policy arsenal for more than 200 years”,119 to opposing arguments 
that sanctions are rather ineffective120, too harmful for a sender 
state,121 or sometimes even counter-productive.122  So, according to 
the recent study by Hufbauer, of the 75 episodes of U.S. economic 
sanctions between 1970 and 2014, success was achieved in only 11 
unilateral U.S. cases;123 but researchers should keep in mind that, in 
the light of the inability to separate the impact of sanctions from 
other factors at play, a “success” of sanctions might be an illusive 
concept.124 
                                                     
(indicating reasons why policymakers can consider economic sanctions as a 
preferred option). 
119 See Jesse Helms, What Sanctions Epidemic? U.S. Business' Curious Crusade, 78 
FOREIGN AFF. 2, 4-5 (1999) (advocating unilateral sanctions to defend U.S. sanctions 
policy against charges of epidemicity by U.S. business).  
120 See, e.g., Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, 22 INT’L 
SECURITY 90, 99-106 (1997) (concluding that that only five percent of sanctions 
episodes succeed); Peter Wallensteen, A Century of Economic Sanctions: A Field 
Revisited, Uppsala Peace Research Papers No. 1, at 6 (2000), available at 
http://www.uu.se/ digitalAssets/18/18601_UPRP_No_1.pdf (noting that an 
analysis of U.N. sanctions cases during the 1990s shows a success rate close to 
twenty percent). 
121 See, e.g., Joanmarie M. Dowling & Mark P. Popiel, War by Sanctions: Are We 
Targeting Ourselves? 11 CURRENTS INT'L TRADE L. J. 8 (2002) (describing four 
economic problem sanctions may create to sender states: (1) a sender state loses 
export business; (2) sender industries are viewed as unreliable; (3) the overuse of 
sanctions provides open markets to competitors; and (4) sanctions negatively affect 
domestic prices). 
122 See, e.g., Zachary Selden, Are Economic Sanctions Still a Valid Option? 11 GEO. 
J. INT'L AFF. 91, 95-96 (2010) (warning that some “sanctions have the potential to 
make the [targeted] regime stronger and less likely to yield to international 
demands”). 
123 See supra note 105 (listing success and failure cases and distinguishing them 
by their policy objectives). 
124 See, e.g., Margaret Doxey, Reflections on the Sanctions Decade and beyond, 64 
INT'L J. 539, 541-542 (2009) (discussing whether the positive effect of sanctions can 
really be measured). 
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Some authors also argue that economic sanctions satisfy 
domestic policy needs to “do something.”125  Such an attractiveness 
of sanctions might result from the growth of media outlets and 
technology that led to increased public attention to foreign policy, 
and, hence, forced politicians to use economic sanctions as an 
internal policy tool to satisfy public demand for U.S. response.126  
Not surprisingly, in the 1990s-2000s, the U.S. Congress became more 
involved in the process of imposing economic sanctions under 
growing public pressure.127  Furthermore, economic sanctions may 
also be considered as a way to communicate official displeasure 
with a foreign state’s behavior.128  Sender states may use this 
signaling effect of economic sanctions to message either to a 
domestic or an international audience.129  
In the 1990s, following the disappearance of prior Soviet 
opposition of U.S. sanctions that had made the United States very 
careful with the imposition of unilateral sanctions against some 
countries which could get economic and political support from the 
Soviet block,130 the U.S. government became a recognized leader in 
sanctions regimes.131  In response to new challenges and conflicts, 
                                                     
125 See generally Benjamin B. Ferencz, Enforcing International Law – A Way to 
World Peace: A Documentary History and Analysis 471 (1983). 
126 See Sarabeth Egle, The Learning Curve of Sanctions - Have Three Decades of 
Sanctions Reform Taught Us Anything? 19 CURRENTS INT'L TRADE L. J. 34, 38 (2011) 
(stating that an increased public knowledge of foreign policy is one of the reasons 
why economic sanctions are so popular in the world); Richard N. Haas, Introduction, 
in ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1, 3 (Richard N. Haas ed., 1998) 
(describing a so-called “CNN effect” of sanctions). See also, Thomas W. Walde, 
Managing the Risk of Sanctions in the Global Oil & Gas Industry: Corporate Response 
Under Political, Legal and Commercial Pressures, 36 TEX. INT'L L. J. 183, 189-191 
(2001) (arguing that “U.S. economic sanctions are basically the result of domestic 
policy pressures”). 
127 See generally HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 71, at 133-136; Kimberly Ann 
Elliott, Trends in Economic Sanctions Policy: Challenges to Conventional Wisdom in 
INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS: BETWEEN WORDS AND WARS IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM 6-7 
(Peter Wallensteen & Carina Staibano ed., 2005). 
128 See Haas, supra note 126, at 2 (noting that, as a form of expression, sanctions 
“can serve to reinforce a commitment to a behavioral norm, such as respect to 
human rights or opposition to proliferation”). 
129 See FRANCESCO GIUMELLY, COERCING, CONSTRAINING AND SIGNALLING: 
EXPLAINING UN AND EU SANCTIONS AFTER THE COLD WAR 35 (2011) (analyzing 
objects and a potential impact of so-called “signalling sanctions” on targets). 
130 See Egle, supra note 126, at 38 (“the U.S. hesitated to enlist sanctions against 
states aligned with the Soviet Union, fearing a reprisal of the sanctions”). 
131 Id. 
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the contemporary sanctions policy was changed to comply with a 
new role of the United States as an economic and political 
hegemon.132  The U.S. government increased a number of economic 
sanctions regimes launched in concert with other countries,133 and 
gave to so-called “smart sanctions” (e.g., arms embargoes, asset 
freezes, targeted financial restrictions, and travel bans), which could 
be aimed at foreign officials or governmental functions without a 
significant negative effect on overall economy and state’s 
population, the preference over old-fashioned comprehensive 
economic measures.134  Today, the United States implements many 
sanctions programs independently of the U.N. Security Council that 
relate to different countries and regions including:  Balkans, Belarus, 
Burma (Myanmar), Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Cuba, North Korea, 
Russia, Syria, and Zimbabwe.135 
Another modern trend of the U.S. sanctions policy is the 
growing attention to non-state actors that may threaten the United 
States, including foreign terrorists, narcotics traffickers, and 
transnational criminal organizations, as well as their members and 
sponsors.  Following September 11, 2001, the George W. Bush 
administration adopted new legislation expanding U.S. 
counter terrorism sanctions program136 against individuals and 
organizations on the list of specifically designated terrorist (SDTs), 
and foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs).  Moreover, to induce the 
wide international cooperation in the war of terror, the United States 
announced its readiness to lift sanctions on previously targeted 
states.137 
                                                     
132 See HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 71, at 125-126 (overviewing the 
development of U.S. sanctions policy in the post-Cold War period).  
133 See id. (noting that a number of U.S. unilateral sanctions decreased 
dramatically in the 1990s). 
134 See id., at 138-141 (analyzing the rising popularity of “smart sanctions”).  
135 See generally OFAC, Sanctions Programs and Country Information, http://  
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/Programs.aspx 
(last visited Jan 29, 2015).  
136 For example, Executive Order of September 23, 2001 authorized the 
Treasury Department to designate, and block the assets of, foreign persons 
determined to have committed terrorist activity. Exec. Order No. 13224 66 Fed. Reg. 
49079 (Sept. 23, 2001). 
137 See generally HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 71, at 141-142.  
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On December 17, 2014, President Obama announced a new 
course in the 50-year U.S. sanctions policy toward Cuba.138  The 
announced changes are intended to normalize diplomatic relations 
between the United States, to authorize travel, certain trade 
relations, and the flow of information to and from Cuba.  Later, the 
U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and the 
U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security 
adopted final rules amending the Cuban Assets Control Regulations 
and the Export Administration Regulations to implement key policy 
changes announced by the President.139  On the one hand, the 
President’s statement that “50 years have shown that isolation has 
not worked,” and the following steps of the Obama administration 
to relax the U.S. embargo of Cuba may demonstrate the failure of 
the Cuban sanctions policy, or even the success of longstanding 
international pressure on U.S. government.140 On the other hand, the 
Cuba precedent may have positive effects on other sanction regimes, 
including Ukraine-related sanctions.  Even if the declared goals of 
Ukraine-related sanctions (i.e., resolution of the conflict which 
respects to Ukraine’s territorial integrity) look rather unrealistic, 
because a proposal to get the Crimean Peninsula back to Ukraine 
would be politically lethal for not only incumbent but also any 
potential Kremlin leaders,141 lifting Cuban sanctions may help to 
overcome the East-West crisis of confidence, and convince Russia’s 
leaders of U.S. readiness to release Russia and its nationals from 
                                                     
138 See Press Release, Statement by the President on Cuba Policy Changes (Dec. 
17, 2014, 12:01 P.M. EST), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/ 
12/17/statement-president-cuba-policy-changes (providing background 
information on the Cuba sanctions and expressing an intention to normalize 
relations between the countries). 
139 See Press Release, Fact Sheet: Treasury and Commerce Announce 
Regulatory Amendments to the Cuba Sanctions (Jan. 15, 2015), 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl9740.aspx 
(observing revised regulations related to the Cuba sanctions, which implement the 
changes announced by the President on December 17, 2014).  
140 Since 1991, the General Assembly regularly adopted the resolutions calling 
the United States to lift its embargo against Cuba.  See Necessity of ending the 
economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of 
America against Cuba, http://www.un.org/en/ga/62/plenary/cuba/bkg.shtml 
(last visited Jan 30, 2015). 
141 The most recognized Russian opposition leaders backed by the West 
confirmed that Crimea must remain the part of the Russian Federation. See Robert 
Mackey, Navalny’s Comments on Crimea Ignite Russian Twittersphere, INT’L N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/17/world/europe/       
navalnys-comments-on-crimea-ignite-russian-twittersphere.html. 
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some sanctions if it takes required steps to settle the conflict in 
Eastern Ukraine.  
In sum, despite the criticism by some states, in the absence of the 
explicit prohibition of the use of unilateral economic measures 
under international law, the United States historically considers 
economic sanctions as a legitimate tool of its foreign policy that 
allows imposing economic and political pressure on other countries 
independently of U.N. Security Council.  Nevertheless, although 
this practice might be supported by the ancient “Lotus principle” 
that a state is permitted to do everything, which is not affirmatively 
prohibited,142 the United States prefers to keep a distance from 
debates on the legality of its sanctions.  By contrast, following a 
position of its predecessor state, Russia is clearly opposed to the U.S. 
unilateral sanction policy invoking its illegality.  But why Russia had 
not changed its approach following the dissolution of the Soviet 
system?  Does Russia really refrain from imposing unilateral 
sanctions on other countries?  The next section addresses these 
questions. 
 
4. RUSSIA’S APPROACH TOWARDS ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: 
IMPROVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES 
 
While Russia argues the illegality of unilateral sanctions, in the 
past two decades, Russia not only adopted its own sanction 
legislation but also developed a distinctive sanction strategy.  In this 
section, I first examine the evolution of Russia’s legal views on the 
permissibility of sanctions and the development of municipal laws 
on economic sanctions, and then discuss Russia’s sanction policy in 
its relations with neighboring countries.  Finally, the section 
considers Russia’s potential responses to new challenges arose from 
the recent waive of Western sanctions and summarizes the 
implications of my findings for Russia’s foreign policy. 
 
4.1. The Evolution of Russia’s Legal Arguments Against Unilateral 
Sanctions 
 
                                                     
142 See generally S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7). 
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In 1935, Soviet Professor Pashukanis stated that economic 
warfare was one of the distinguishing features of wars between 
imperialistic states of those days,143 but he could not anticipate that 
ten years later those economic measurers would become the popular 
elements of peaceful relations between nations.  Since Communist 
countries had been the key targets of U.S. sanctions policy at the end 
of World War II, it is not surprising that the Soviet Union played a 
leading role in opposing the unilateral use of economic coercive 
measures.  
To legally challenge the active sanctions policy of Western states, 
the Soviet Union reached a consensus with developing countries on 
the illegality of unilateral coercive measures through broadening the 
definitions of “aggression” and “use of force.”  Further, the joint 
political efforts of the Communist block and developing states to 
include non-forcible coercive actions within the general prohibition 
of force were not only noted by many observers,144 but, as discussed 
above, successfully reflected in many resolutions of the U.N. 
General Assembly.145  
Noting the aforementioned difference between the 
interpretations of the use of force under Article 2(4) of the U.N. 
Charter by socialist and capitalist states, Tunkin advocated the 
Soviet Union’s position that the concept of force includes not only 
armed force including, certainly, economic force which might 
“represent a very considerable threat to independence of [targeted] 
states, and m[ight] produce a significant destabilisation of 
international relations.”146  
In the same way that Communist and developing states 
supported the broad definition of “force,” the Soviet Union 
recognized a legal interpretation of the principle of non-intervention 
stated by the Declaration on Principles of International Law147 that 
                                                     
143 See E. PASHUKANIS, OCHERKI PO MEZHDUNARODNOMU PRAVU [ESSAYS ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW] 203-204 (1971) (Russ.) (criticizing capitalistic approaches to 
economic warfare). 
144 See Brosche, supra note 78, at 18, 20 (noting that the states of East block and 
developing countries collaborated to support a broad interpretation of the 
prohibition on force covering political and economic pressure). 
145 See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.  
146 GRIGORI TUNKIN, LAW AND FORCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 82 (1983). 
147 See supra note 81 and accompanying text (detailing the decisions and 
documents of international organizations prohibiting unilateral economic 
coercion). 
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included the use of economic coercive measures against other 
states.148  The difference between Soviet and Western views on the 
definition of the “intervention” allowed Soviet opponents to counter 
socialist ideology of peaceful relations between states, and 
prohibition of any kind of intervention with the “imperialist policy” 
of covert interventions into internal affairs of sovereign states, 
including different types of economic interventions.149  In addition, 
Soviet scholars argued that U.S. unilateral economic sanctions 
breached the international obligations of the United States under 
bilateral and multilateral treaties,150 and the extraterritorial 
application of sanctions violated the principle of sovereign equality 
of states.151 
Professor Vasilenko expressed an opposing view on the 
permissibility of unilateral coercive measures under international 
law, observing that “recognizing the sanction characteristic of the 
coercive measures of international organizations only, and 
countering them with self-help or reprisals lead to the 
overestimation of the coercive prerogatives of international 
organizations, and place in question states’ right to coerce.”152  In his 
study, Vasilenko suggested distinguishing legally acceptable self-
help coercive measures in response to international violations (e.g., 
retortions, reprisals, nonrecognition, diplomatic break, and self-
defense)153 from the unlawful use of force.  He gave two examples 
of the latter: U.S. unilateral sanctions related to the imposition of 
martial law in Poland, and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.154  In the 
late 1980s, new approaches to the international responsibility of 
states made more authors reconsider the traditional position and 
admit that unilateral non-force coercive measures might be 
                                                     
148 MEZHDUNARODNOE PRAVO [INTERNATIONAL LAW] 119-120 (G. I. Tunkin ed., 
1982) (Russ.). 
149 See generally V. I. Lisovskii, Mezhdunarodnoe pravo [International Law] 81-
85 (1970); D. B. Levin, Mezhdunarodnoe pravo, vneshniaia politika i diplomatiia 
[International Law, Foreign Policy and Diplomacy] 79-84 (1981) (Russ.).  See also M. 
M. Avakov et al. Narusheniia SShA norm mezhdunarodnogo prava [U.S.A.’s 
Violations of the Rules of International Law] 17-18 (1984) (Russ.) (stating that U.S. 
economic pressure on socialistic states violates the principle of non-intervention). 
150 Id. at 55-57. 
151 Id. at 165-177. 
152 V. A. VASILENKO, MEZHDUNARODNO-PRAVOVYE SANKTSII [INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL SANCTIONS] 30-31 (1982) (Russ.). 
153 See id. at 78-95.  
154 See id. at 33-34.  
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permissible under certain conditions,155 but such changes did not 
affect their views on the illegality of the U.S. sanctions policy.156  
While, as discussed above, the Soviet Union was recognized as 
“one of the vehement defenders of a wide concept concerning Art. 
2(4) [of the U.N. Charter]”,157 this approach was later criticized by 
Russian commenters;158 some modern Russian scholars also 
emphasize that the prohibition of the use of force as a rule of 
customary international law does not include economic coercive 
measures.159  Noting concerns about the U.S. use of unilateral 
coercive economic measures against other nations, and emphasizing 
Russia’s official position regarding the illegal character of so-called 
“sanctions” imposed without the mandate of the U.N. Security 
Council,160 Batrishin, however, admits the legality of retortions and 
countermeasures under international law. 161  Some commentators 
went further, arguing that unilateral coercive measures have no 
                                                     
155 See, e.g., N. A. Ushakov, Problemy teorii mezhdunarodnogo prava 
[Problems of the Theory of International Law] 181-182 (1988) (Russ.).  Ushakov 
notes that not only international organizations but any state has a right to use 
coercive measures against a violator of international law, as states’ international 
responsibility and international sanctions are outside the framework of Article 2.4 
of the U.N. Charter. 
156 See id. at 185-186.  
157 Brosche, supra note 78, at 20. 
158 See generally S. V. CHERNICHENKO, MEZHDUNARODNOE PRAVO: COVREMENNYE 
TEORETICHESKIE PROBLEM [INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONTEMPORARY THEORETICAL 
PROBLEMS] 222-224 (1993) (Russ.). See also S. V. Marinich, Ekonomicheskie sanktsii 
v mezhdunarodnom prave [Economic Sanctions in International Law], at 12-14 
(1989) (unpublished synopsis of Cand. Sc. (Law) dissertation, Lomonosov Moscow 
State University) (on file with the SPARK Legal Library) (arguing that the definition 
of “force” under Article 2(4) does not include unilateral economic sanctions, and 
the legality of any sanction should be examined by the principle of non-intervention 
rather that Article 2(4)). 
159 See, e.g., I.N. Zhdanov, Prinuditel’nye mery v mezhdunarodnom prave 
[Coercive Measures in International Law], at 155-157 (1999) (unpublished Dr. Sc. 
(Law) dissertation, Moscow State Institute of International Relations) (on file with 
the Russian State Library) (stating that a lack of the agreed interpretation of the 
term “force” does not allow to effectively use Art. 2(4) of the U.N. Charter with 
respect to economic coercive measures). 
160 See R.R. Batrishin, Otvetstvennost’ gosudarstva i primenenie kontrmer v 
sovremennom mezhdunarodnom prave [State Responsibility and the Use of 
Countermeasures in Contemporary International Law], at 6 (2005) (unpublished 
Cand. Sc. (Law) dissertation, Kazan State University) (on file with the Russian State 
Library) (criticizing U.S. unilateral economic sanctions against Cuba, Myanmar and 
Syria as unlawful).  
161 See, e.g., id. at 135-149 (analyzing approaches to the legality of 
countermeasures in contemporary international law).  
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legitimacy because the principle of sovereign equality of states 
precludes the unilateral use of sanctions against another state or a 
group of states (par in parem non habet imperium).162  In contrast, 
Rachkov points to the absence of an explicit customary international 
rule prohibiting unilateral economic sanctions.163   Based on his own 
analysis of the current sanction campaign against Russia in 
connection with the crisis in Ukraine, he alleges that economic 
sanctions imposed on Russia and its nationals by the United States 
and its allies may be justifiable as countermeasures.164 
Professor Lukashuk made very interesting observations about 
the uselessness of any attempts to justify U.S. unilateral sanctions 
policy.  From his point of view, the Unites States uses a very 
distinctive conception of sanctions, which may be imposed for the 
sake of foreign policy or national security objectives.165  Taking into 
account that in practice those objectives may include the overthrow 
of a foreign government or change of its behavior, by his analysis, 
such sanctions are not a matter of international law.166 
A diversity of academic views concerning the legality of 
unilateral economic sanctions in relatively recent studies has not, 
however, affected the official position of the Russian Federation.  
From Russia’s perspective, the purpose of its foreign policy tradition 
to support the illegality of the unilateral use of coercive measures is 
not only to deter the United States and other proponents of 
economic sanctions from placing harmful economic measures on the 
“defenseless victims” of their aggressive foreign policy, it is also to 
help increase the role of the Security Council of the United Nations, 
                                                     
162 See M. V. Ryzhova, Ekonomicheskie sanktsii v sovremennom 
mezhdunarodnom prave [Economic Sanctions in Contemporary International 
Law], at 10, 43-47 (2006) (unpublished Cand. Sc. (Law) dissertation, Kazan State 
University) (on file with the Russian State Library); A. V. Kalinin, Ekonomicheskie 
sanktsii OON i odnostoronnie eksterritorial’nye mery ekonomicheskogo prinuzhdeniia 
[U.N. Economic Sanctions and Exterritorial Unilateral Coercive Measures], IURIST-
MEZHDUNARODNIK, No. 4, at 34-37 (2005) (Russ.) (arguing that unilateral economic 
sanctions are illegal because one sovereign power has no right to exercise 
jurisdiction over another sovereign power). 
163 I. Rachkov, Ekonomicheskie sanktsii s tochki zreniia GATT/VTO [Economic 
Sanction from GATT/WTO perspective], MEZHDUNARODNOE PRAVOSUDIE, No. 3(11), at 
102 (2014) (Russ.). 
164 Id. at 104-105. 
165 I. I. LUKASHUK, PRAVO MEZHDUNARODNOI OTVERSTVENNOSTI [LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY] 312-314 (2004) (Russ.). 
166 Id. 
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and, consequently, the powers of its permanent members, including 
the Russian Federation itself.  
However, that moral ascendancy over Western opponents 
allows Russia to strengthen its Soviet-style role as a leader of 
developing countries that suffer from Western economic pressure.  
As a result, Russia would be able to get support of other participants 
of the joint crusade of developing nations against unilateral 
sanctions.  For example, in 2000, Russia’s representatives submitted 
to the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and 
on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization a working 
paper entitled “Basic conditions and standard criteria for the 
introduction of sanctions and other coercive measures and their 
implementation” (A/AC.182/L.100).  Section I(1) of the paper states 
that 
[t]he application of sanctions is an extreme measure and is 
permitted only after all other peaceful means of settling the 
dispute or conflict and of maintaining or restoring 
international peace and security, including the provisional 
measures provided for in Article 40 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, have been exhausted and only when the 
Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to peace, 
a breach of the peace or an act of aggression.167 
In the following years, Russia developed this working paper to 
the draft of the declaration and proposed that the Committee 
members recommend it to the U.N. General Assembly for 
adoption.168  
Around the same time period, President Putin, in his address to 
the U.N. Security Council, reiterated the maintenance of the 
longstanding principle of Russia’s foreign policy that any 
                                                     
167 Rep. of the Special Comm. on the Charter of the U.N. and on the 
Strengthening of the Role of the Org., May 22, 2000, U.N. Doc. A/55/33; GAOR, 
55th Sess., Supp. No. 33 (2000), available at 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/55/ a5533supp.pdf (emphasis added). 
168 The draft resolution entitled “Declaration on the basic conditions and 
standard criteria for the introduction of sanctions and other coercive measures and 
their implementation” was proposed by the Russian Federation to the Special 
Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the 
Role of the Organization in 2003.  See Rep. of the Special Comm. on the Charter of 
the U.N. and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Org., Apr. 17, 2002, U.N. Doc. 
A/58/33; GAOR, 58th Sess., Supp. No. 33 (2003), available at http://www.un.org/ 
en/ga/search/ view_doc.asp?symbol=A/58/33(Supp). 
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imposition of economic sanctions without authorization of the 
Security Council would be officially treated by Russia as a violation 
of international law:  “Only the Security Council has the right to 
sanction such an extreme measure as the use of force in the situation 
of crisis.  It does so on behalf and in the interests of the whole world 
community as the Security Council bears special responsibility for 
it.”169  
Another possible explanation why Russia holds its own is that, 
despite the significant progress in the U.S.-Russia collaboration in 
the U.N. Security Council on the use of U.N. sanctions addressing 
threats to international peace and security, Russia remains 
suspicious of the West’s motives.  For instance, keeping the 
notorious Jackson-Vanik Amendments in place, the United States 
hung it as a sword of Damocles over Russia to counteract a 
regression of its internal human rights policy.170  Thus, even in the 
1990s, the warmest decade of the U.S.-Russia relations, Russia had 
to keep strong legal arguments to contest a potential new round of 
economic sanctions that the United States could impose on it.  
Although on a diplomatic level Russia plays a leading role in 
creating international consensus on the illegality of the unilateral 
use of economic sanctions, realpolitik’s si vis pacem, para bellum 
principle dictates that Russia’s government must develop its own 
full arsenal of economic coercive measures to address potential 
challenges and threats, as the next Section will discuss. 
 
4.2. Legislation on Economic Measures  
 
The development of Russian legislation concerning the use of 
economic measures in international relations was influenced by 
several external and internal factors.  First, Russia’s political and 
economic transformation, and greater integration into the world 
trading system in the 1990s caused the necessity for the Russian 
government to have more legal instruments of foreign trade policy.  
Second, in the light of the increased use of the United Nations’ 
                                                     
169 Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, Address to the United 
Nations Security Council (Sept. 7, 2000), http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/8700. 
170 See Cowan, supra note 5, at 757 (“Keeping Jackson-Vanik in place . . . will 
aid in avoiding a regression of the emigration progress achieved in Russia.  If such 
regression did begin, then Jackson-Vanik would still be in place to counteract it.”). 
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sanctions, Russia had to take required legislative measures to 
implement the Security Council resolutions.  Third, more aggressive 
foreign policy of Russia in the 2000s, including escalating tensions 
between Russia and its neighboring trade partners, required the 
adaptation of modern national legislation concerning the use of 
economic countermeasures.  A review of that legislation helps to 
more precisely understand the approach of the Russian Federation 
towards the use of economic sanctions and a range of measures the 
Russian government may take in response to economic sanctions 
imposed by Western states. 
The use of retortions and countermeasures by the Russian 
Federation is governed today by federal legislation.171  Article 1194 
of the Civil Code states that the government may establish 
reciprocal limitations (retortions) on the property and personal non-
property rights of citizens and legal entities of the states where 
special limitations exist on the property and personal non-property 
rights of Russian citizens and legal entities.172  This provision, with 
some minor modification, was inherited from Soviet civil 
legislation173 but has not been used by the Russian government.174  
The Russian Federal Law On Treaties of the Russian Federation also 
provides that, if a party violated its obligations under a treaty with 
the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, alone or 
jointly with other authorized bodies, shall provide the president or 
government with proposals on required measures pursuant to the 
rules of international law and the provisions of the treaty.175  
Furthermore, there are two federal statutes that authorize the 
                                                     
171 Under the 1993 Constitution, the powers in the domain of international 
trade and foreign economic relations vested in federal authorities. See 
KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 71(zh), 71(l) 
(Russ.). 
172 GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 1194 
(Russ.). 
173 Osnovy Grazhdanskogo Zakonodatel'stva Soiuza SSR i Respublik 
[Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics] art. 
162, VEDOMOSTI S''EZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV SSSR I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR 
[VED. SSSR] [BULLETIN OF THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLES DEPUTIES OF THE USSR AND 
SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE USSR] 1991, No. 26, Item 733 (Russ.).  
174 See supra note 163, at 101 (analyzing legal measures Russia can use 
responding to the current economic sanctions). 
175 Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorakh Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii [Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Treaties of the Russian 
Federation] art. 33, SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] 
[RUSSIAN FEDERATION COLLECTION OF LEGISLATION] 1995, No. 29, Item 2757. 
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Russian government to use economic measures against foreign 
states and their nationals:  the Federal Law On Fundamental 
Principles of State Regulation of Foreign Trade Activity176 and the 
Federal Law On Special Economic Measures.177 
Federal Law On Fundamental Principles of State Regulation of 
Foreign Trade Activity authorizes the President to restrict 
international trade by measures required in connection with 
Russia’s participation in international sanctions placed by the U.N. 
Security Council.178  The government is also entitled to enact 
responding trade-restrictive measures (countermeasures) against a 
foreign state, if that state: (1) violates its international obligations to 
Russia; (2) takes measures disserving Russia’s economic or political 
interests including bans access to its market for Russian nationals or 
otherwise discriminates them; (3) does not provide appropriate and 
effective defense to the interests of Russian national within its 
territory; or (4) does not take reasonable actions to prevent the illegal 
activity of the individuals or legal entities of the respective state 
within the territory of the Russian Federation.179 
The enactment of the Federal Law On Special Economic 
Measures in 2006 expanded the legal framework for the use of 
economic coercive measures.  According to the Committee on 
Security of the State Duma, this bill had been an “opportune attempt 
to legislatively figure out and institutionalize the tools of economic 
impact on states that pursue unfriendly policies toward the Russian 
Federation and its citizens.”180  It gave the President the authority to 
                                                     
176 Federal’nyi Zakon RF ob Osnovakh Gosudarstvennogo Regulirovaniia 
Vneshnetorgovoi Deiatel’nosti [Federal Law of the Russian Federation on 
Fundamental Principles of State Regulation of Foreign Trade Activity], SOBRANIE 
ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [RUSSIAN FEDERATION COLLECTION 
OF LEGISLATION] 2003, No. 50, Item 4850. 
177 Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Spetsial’nykh Ekonomicheskikh Merakh [Federal 
Law of the Russian Federation on Special Economic Measures], SOBRANIE 
ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [RUSSIAN FEDERATION COLLECTION 
OF LEGISLATION] 2007, No. 1, Item 44. 
178 Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Fundamental Principles of State 
Regulation of Foreign Trade Activity art. 37. 
179 Id. art. 40. 
180 Federal’noie Sobranie Rossiiskoi Federastii [Federal Assembly of the 
Russian Federation], Zakluchenie Komiteta Gosudarstvennoi Dumy po 
Bezopasnosti [Opinion of the Committee on Security of the State Duma], No. 
98/3.2, Nov. 9, 2006, available at 
http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/main.nsf/%28SpravkaNew%29?OpenAgent&RN=35
3522-4&02. 
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employ specific economic measures “in case of appearance of set of 
the circumstances requiring immediate reaction to international 
illegal act or unfriendly action of a foreign state, or its bodies and 
officials, that threatens to interests and security of the Russian 
Federation, and (or) entrenches on rights and freedoms of its 
citizens, as well as pursuant to the resolutions of the Security 
Council of the United Nations.”181  The list of available economic 
measures includes:  the suspension of the implementation of 
economic, technical and military-technical-cooperation programs; 
the prohibition or limitation of financial transactions or foreign 
economic operations; the termination or suspension of trade or other 
treaties in the area of economic relations; the change of custom 
duties; the imposition of a ban or the restriction on calls at Russian 
ports for vessels and the use of Russia’s airspace; the restriction of 
tourist activity; the prohibition on international scientific 
cooperation.182 
In addition to these general legal frameworks, Russia’s 
legislation gives the government discretion to utilize certain 
sanctions in case of other emergencies.  For example, in order to 
implement the U.N. Security Council resolutions or to protect 
Russia’s national interests, the President may prohibit or impose 
restrictions on the export of arms and ammunition to certain 
countries.183  Russia’s government also reserved a right to take 
measures (“permissible under contemporary international law and 
                                                     
181 Federal law On Special Economic Measures art. 1(2). 
182 Id. art. 3(2). 
183 Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Voenno-tekhnicheskom Sotrudnichestve Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii s Inostrannymi Gosudarstvami [Federal Law of the Russian Federation 
on Military-technical cooperation between the Russian Federation and Foreign 
States] art. 6(3), SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] 
[RUSSIAN FEDERATION COLLECTION OF LEGISLATION] 1998, No. 30, Item 3610; Ukaz 
Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii o Poriadke Vvedeniia Embargo na Postavku 
Vooruzheniia I Voennoi Tekhniki, Okazanie Uslug Voenno-tekhnicheskogo 
Kharaktera, a Takzhe na Postavku Syria, Materialov, Oborudovaniia i Peredachu 
Tekhnologii Voennogo i Dvoinogo Naznacheniia Zarubezhnym Gosudarstvam, v 
Tom Chisle Uchastnikam SNG [Executive Order of the President of the Russian 
Federation on Procedure for Imposing an Embargo on Arms and Military 
Equipment Supplies, Military-Technical Services, and Supplies of Raw Materials 
and Equipment, and Transfers of Military and Dual-Use Technologies to Foreign 
States, Including CIS Members], SOBRANIE AKTOV PRESIDENTA I PRAVITELSTVA 
ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SAPP] [COLLECTION OF ACTS OF THE PRESIDENT AND 
GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION] 1993, No. 8, Item 658. 
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used in international practice”) in response to the gross violations of 
rights of its compatriots by foreign countries.184  
In 2012, the placement of the Magnitsky Act sanctions on 
Russian officials triggered a reaction of the Russian legislature.  
Russia’s Federal Assembly enacted the Federal Law on Coercive 
Measures for Individuals Violating Fundamental Human Rights 
and Freedoms of the Citizens of the Russian Federation185 (also 
known as the Dima Yakovlev Law), which, according to Russia’s 
Prime Minister, “was definitely adopted under the influence of 
emotions created by the relevant decision of the U.S. Congress.”186  
It authorized the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to designate U.S. 
citizens, who have been involved in human rights violations or 
certain unfriendly actions against Russian citizens.  These U.S. 
individuals are subject to a visa ban; any transactions with their 
property or investments are prohibited and their assets within 
Russian territory must be frozen.187  Russian “tit-for-tat” list of 
designated persons includes a number of U.S. officials responsible 
for “the legalization of torture” and “unlimited detention” including 
tortures in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.188  In addition, the Act bans the 
                                                     
184 Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii o Merakh po Podderzhke 
Sootechestvennikov za Rubezhom [Decree of the Government of the Russian 
Federation on Measures Supporting Compatriots Abroad], SOBRANIE 
ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [RUSSIAN FEDERATION COLLECTION 
OF LEGISLATION] 1994, No. 21, Item 2383. 
185 Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Merakh Vozdeistviia na Lits, Prichastnykh k 
Narusheniiam Osnovopolagaiushchikh Prav i Svobod Cheloveka, Prav i Svobod 
Grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federtsii [Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Coercive 
Measures for Individuals Violating Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of 
the Citizens of the Russian Federation], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI 
FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [RUSSIAN FEDERATION COLLECTION OF LEGISLATION] 2012, No. 53, 
Item 7597. 
186 Interview with Dmitry Medvedev, the Prime Minister of the Russian 
Federations, CNN (Jan. 27, 2013), available at http://government.ru/en/news/ 
160/. 
187 Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Coercive Measures for 
Individuals Violating Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Citizens of 
the Russian Federation art. 1-2. 
188 See Ellen Barry, Russia Bars 18 Americans After Sanctions by U.S., N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 13, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/world/europe/russia-bars-
18-americans-in-tit-for-tat-on-rights.html?_r=0. Therefore, Russia had responded 
with counter allegation about the use of torture by the C.I.A., which the United 
States officially affirmed about a year and a half later. See generally Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency 's 
Detention and Interrogation Program (declassified and released in Dec. 2014), 
available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/study2014/sscistudy1.pdf. 
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adoption of Russian orphans by American citizens,189 and prohibits 
the activity of political non-profit organizations funded by the U.S. 
nationals and threatening to Russia's interests.190  
As this section shows, the Russian Federation has a broad range 
of regulations and legal frameworks to adopt sanctions regimes 
against other states and their nationals.  As discussed below, with 
some exceptions today, Russia’s government still hesitates to invoke 
its economic sanctions legislation to justify the trade restrictions it 
places on Russia’s neighboring states, pointing instead to non-
conformity with Russian sanitary and epidemiological or technical 
standards. 
 
4.3.  Russia’s Trade Wars With Neighboring Countries: Trade 
Embargos as a Foreign Policy Instrument 
 
Compared to U.S. experience with the imposition of unilateral 
economic sanctions in response to any kind of foreign policy or 
security concerns, a few episodes of Soviet economic sanctions were 
aimed at its neighbors and other members of Communist block to 
pull rebellious regimes back to Moscow’s orbit.  According to 
Hufbauer and Schott’s case study, those Soviet Union’s attempts 
were almost always unsuccessful.191  
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 did not lead to the 
termination of most strong economic ties amongst Soviet-successor 
states, even though new boundaries appeared between the 
producers and consumers of this former single market.  Given that 
now, for many new post-Soviet states – especially for the members 
of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which use trade 
                                                     
However, similar to the Magnitsky case, commentators criticized U.S. reluctance to 
punish officials responsible for those human rights violations. See The Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “If the US tortures, why can’t 
we do it?” – UN expert says moral high ground must be recovered (Dec. 11, 2014), http:// 
www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15406&La
ngID=E. 
189 Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Coercive Measures for 
Individuals Violating Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Citizens of 
the Russian Federation art. 4. 
190 Id. art. 3. 
191 The only mentioned exception was the successful economic measures of 
1958 (so-called “Nightfrost Crisis”) taken by the U.S.S.R. against Finland.  See 
HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 71, at 14. 
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preferences within the CIS free trade area – Russia is still the most 
important export market for their goods, modern Russian political 
elite often yield to the temptation of accessing Russia’s emerging 
consumer market as an non-forcible instrument to achieve their 
foreign policy objectives. In the 1990s, Russia utilized economic 
coercion to protect political and economic rights of ethnic Russian 
minorities in the post-Soviet countries six times.192 In the 2000s-
2010s Russia more aggressively imposed trade embargo on the 
states of its so-called “near abroad” (“blizhnee zarubezh’e”) if they 
had somehow challenged the role of Russia as the main political 
player of the region.193 
Some commentators point out that, Russia, unlike the United 
States, has never deployed economic sanctions against other states 
without the resolution of the U.N. Security Council194 to achieve its 
relatively modest political goals.  Instead, Russia confines itself to 
the imposition of selective import restrictions on the grounds of 
public-health or epidemiological concerns, or even technical 
problems in customs processing.  Intending to maximize economic 
costs for targeted states, Russia’s government chooses their sensitive 
industries with deep dependency on Russia’s consumer market to 
ban imports of certain goods (mostly food and agricultural 
produce).  As a consequence, “quiet diplomacy” almost always 
prevails in such trade conflicts, and, in lieu of the Russian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the central role in Russia’s public relations is 
played by such non-traditional for international affairs 
governmental authorities as: Federal Consumer Protection Service 
(Rospotrebnadzor), Federal Veterinary and Phytosanitary Control 
Service (Rosselkhoznadzor), and, sometimes, Federal Customs 
Service (FTS Rossii).  
The only exception was economic sanctions related to the 2008 
Russia-Georgia military conflict.  In August 2008, for the first time 
                                                     
192 Id. at 131.  
193 See Will Englund & Kathy Lally, Despite Ukraine triumph, Russia's relations 
with its neighbors are under strain, THE WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 28, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/despite-ukraine-triumph-
russias-relations-with-its-neighbors-are-under-strain/2013/11/28/337a834c-576e-
11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html (discussing a practice of the use of trade 
restrictions to restore Russia’s influence in the former Soviet space).  
194 The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Center, Russian 
Federation: Legal Aspects of War in Georgia, at 13 (Sept. 2008), available at 
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/legal-aspects-of-war/russia-legal-aspects-of-
war.pdf. 
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ever, Russia’s President mentioned Russia’s right to utilize 
economic sanctions, as the last extreme measure in response to an 
aggressive act of a foreign state.195  On January 16, 2009, based on 
the Russian Federal law on Special Economic Measures, President 
Medvedev issued Executive Order No. 64s, imposing an arms 
embargo on Georgia.196   However, while officially this Executive 
Order prohibited all (non-existent) Russian deliveries of weapon, 
military and dual-use equipment, and technologies to the potential 
conflict zone, its main purpose was to use those sanctions as a strong 
signal to other countries to warn them against supplying arms to 
Georgian forces.197 
Table 2 below summarizes some of the most notorious sanction 
episodes between 2000 and 2014 and shows the pursued goals and 
results of their deployment. 
 
Table 2. Selected Russia’s Sanction Episodes (2000-2014) 
Targeted State Years Background and Resolution 
Abkhazia 
(a non-recognized 
state) 
2004 Background and Objectives: On 
December 2, 2004, following an 
announcement that the first round of the 
presidential election was won by 
opposition candidate Sergei Bagapsh, 
Russia stopped train service between 
Russia and Abkhazia, and threatened to 
close the border entirely.  In addition, 
                                                     
195 Dmitry Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, Interview to Russian 
TV-channels (Aug. 31, 2008, 19:00) (Russ.), http://www.kremlin.ru/news/1276. 
196 Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii o Merakh po Zapreshcheniiu 
Postavok Gruzii Produktsii Voennogo i Dvoinogo Naznacheniia [Executive Order 
of the President of the Russian Federation on Measures to Prohibit Supplies to 
Georgia of Military and Dual-use Production], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA 
ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [RUSSIAN FEDERATION COLLECTION OF LEGISLATION] 
2009, No. 3, Item 365.   
197 See Helena Bedwell, Medvedev Calls for Sanctions Against Countries That Arm 
Georgia, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 19, 2009 10:27 EST), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aGvmcqiv_1eQ (last visited Feb. 17, 2015) 
(“The order seemed to be directed primarily against Ukraine, which Russia has 
accused of delivering arms to Georgia before the war over the separatist region of 
South Ossetia.”). 
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Russia prohibited the import of tangerines 
and persimmons. 
Resolution: On December 6, 2014, 
Abkhazia’s two key rival candidates 
reached an agreement, brokered by 
Russia, to resolve their dispute and hold a 
new election.  Several days later, all 
restrictions were lifted.  
Moldova 2005 
 -  
2009 
Background and Objectives: In September 
2005, following rising political tensions 
between Russia and Moldova, FTS Rossii 
suspended (for “technical reasons”) the 
issue of tax labels for wine producers from 
Moldova.  In March 2006, 
Rospotrebnadzor prohibited the import of 
Moldovan wine. 
Resolution: In 2007, the Presidents of 
Russia and Moldova agreed to scrap the 
ban on wine.  In 2009, Russia lifted the 
embargo and offered a $0.5 
billion credit line to Moldova. 
Poland 2005  
-  
2007 
Background and Objectives: In November 
2005, Russia prohibited meat and 
vegetable exports from Poland, citing 
poor standards in re-export certification.  
Russian experts alleged that this ban was 
a response to the “unfriendly” policies of 
the Polish government.  Further, Poland 
blocked EU-Russia negotiations on a new 
wide-ranging partnership agreement, 
insisting that Moscow first lift the ban. 
Resolution: In 2007, following two-year 
negotiations, Russia’s government lifted 
the import ban on Polish meat.  
Georgia 2006 
- 
present 
time 
Background and Objectives: In 2006, 
following the so-called Rose Revolution 
Russia imposed an import ban on 
Georgia’s key agricultural exports (wine, 
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water, and fruits).  Russia’s objective was 
to secure Georgia’s recognition of 
independence for South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia.  In response, Georgia 
announced it would block Russia’s WTO 
accession until sanctions were lifted.  
Russia halted all transport to and from 
Georgia, imposed an aviation and postal 
blockade, deported more than 1,000 illegal 
immigrants, and increased the price of oil 
exported to Georgia.  Following the 
August 2008 military conflict, Russia 
recognized the two regions as 
independent and broke off diplomatic ties 
with Georgia.  
Resolution: In 2010, Russia and Georgia 
reopened air traffic between the two 
countries for the first time since the 2008 
war; Georgia withdrew its objection to 
Russia’s membership in the WTO.  In 2013, 
Russia lifted its embargo for wine, mineral 
water and some fruits and vegetables.  
Although the embargo against some 
agricultural exports remains in place, in 
January 2015 Russia and Georgia agreed 
that restrictions on Georgian agricultural 
products would be eliminated. 
Ukraine  2006 Background and Objectives: In January 
2006, Russia banned Ukrainian meat and 
milk imports, citing violations of 
veterinary standards.  Ukraine’s officials 
accused Russia of the imposition of 
politically motivated embargo in 
retaliation for Ukraine's attempt to seize 
lighthouses on the Crimean peninsula that 
were used by Russia's Black Sea Navy.  
Another alleged reason of the trade war 
was that it had been Russia’s additional 
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leverage in bilateral negotiations over gas 
prices for 2006. 
Resolution: Later that year, 
Rosselkhoznadzor permitted a number of 
Ukraine producer to import their 
meat and milk products.  
Latvia  2006  
- 
2007 
Background and Objectives: In October 
2006, Rosselkhozhadzor announced that it 
banned canned fish imports from Latvian 
plants, because of a high concentration of 
benzopyrene in their products.  “This 
could be a coincidence, but [almost 
simultaneously] Russia and Latvia settled 
their territorial dispute over Pskov 
Oblast's Pytalovskii Region (the [border] 
treaty was signed in March 2007).” 
Resolution: In 2007, Russia lifted the 
restrictions on Latvian canned fish.  
Belarus  2009 Background and Objectives: In June 2006, 
Rospotrebnadzor prohibited the import of 
most categories of dairy products from 
Belarus, citing noncompliance with new 
Russia’s technical standards.  Alleged 
reasons included the 2009 Russia-Belarus 
gas negotiations, and Russia’s intention to 
participate in the privatization of 
Belarusian large food producers.  The 
President of Belarus also accused Moscow 
of blackmailing him to make Belarus 
recognize the independence of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia.  
Resolution: In August 2009, Russia and 
Belarus announced that they resolved a 
crisis, and agreed to lift a ban Belarus’ 
milk export. 
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Ukraine 2012 Background and Objectives: In February 
2012, Rospontebnadzor announced that it 
prohibited Ukrainian cheese 
imports, accusing Ukrainian producers of 
using excessive quantities of palm oil, 
a cheap substitute for milk.  Ukraine 
denied those accusations, claiming that 
Russia’s ban was politically 
motivated and caused by Ukraine’s 
refusal to join a Russia-led Customs 
Union.  
Resolution: Following the two-month ban, 
Russia agreed to open its market for 
Ukrainian cheese.  
Ukraine 2013  
-  
present 
time 
Background and Objectives: In July 2013, 
Rospontebnadzor imposed a ban on 
imports of Ukrainian confectionary 
producer Roshen, citing bad quality and 
the violations of labeling requirements.  
Further, FTS Rossii enhanced border 
controls for imports from Ukraine, and a 
certification authority suspended 
certificates of conformity for Ukrainian 
railcars.  In 2014, Russia also imposed a 
ban on Ukrainian poultry meat, cheeses, 
potatoes, dairy, and alcohol products. 
Despite the economic and political 
pressure from Russia, on 21 March 2014, 
Ukraine signed the EU-Ukraine 
Association Agreement.  In September 
2014, Russia’s government decided to 
permit the revocation of tariff preferences 
for Ukraine under the CIS Free Trade 
Agreement. 
Resolution: The problem is still not 
resolved. 
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Lithuania 2013  
-  
2014 
Background and Objectives: In October 
2013, Rospontebnadzor imposed an 
import ban on all dairy products from 
Lithuania, citing numerous violations of 
Russia’s sanitary regulations.  The alleged 
reason of this import ban was Lithuania’s 
role in supporting the development of the 
EU Eastern Partnership Program to enter 
into the association agreement with 
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.  In 
response, Lithuania threatened to block 
Russia's road and rail access to the 
Russian exclave Kaliningrad, which 
shares a border with Lithuania. 
Resolution: In January 2014, 
Rospotrebnadzor lifted import 
restrictions from some dairy products. 
Moldova 2013  
- 
present 
time 
Background and Objectives: In September 
2013, Rospotrebnadzor prohibited wine 
imports from Moldova, accusing 
Moldavian producers of the violations of 
quality standards, and in April 2014 
blocked the supplies of processed pork 
meat products  On June 27, 2014, Moldova 
signed the EU-Moldova Association 
Agreement.  Following that, Russia 
blocked imports of canned vegetables and 
fruits citing non-compliance with Russia 
quality and sanitary requirements.  In July 
2014, Russia’s government adopted the 
Decree abolishing preferred custom 
duties for Moldavian goods under CIS 
Free Trade Agreement. 
Resolution: The problem is still not 
resolved. 
 
One might argue that a highly suspicious chain of 
“coincidences,” or obvious political benefits Russia got from the 
imposition of import restrictions on neighboring countries, is not 
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itself sufficient to allege any political motivation behind the actions 
of Russia’s controlling authorities.  Whether the highlighted cases 
were the uses of tacit economic coercion measures or of Russia’s 
invocation to public health or epidemiological concerns caused only 
by “true” importers’ violations, is not known.  What is known is, 
from Russian government’s perspective, its alleged strategy to 
camouflage the use of trade restrictions as a political weapon looks 
very reasonable.  The potential advantage it expects from this 
strategy is multifaceted.  First, tacit economic sanctions are 
considered a more effective “stick” to punish dissident allies or 
neighbors than U.S.-style official sanctions.  While such hopes are 
sometimes disappointed, the case study shows that tacit sanctions 
can be speedy, informal, and confidential.  
Second, by virtue of such short-term import measures, Russia 
can combine its foreign policy goals with plain trade protectionism 
to promote the development of domestic production.  If a targeted 
state brings the WTO case, Russia can invoke the hardly contestable 
general exemption on measures that are “necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health” permitted under GATT 
Article XX(b). 
Third, Russia’s officials may also hope that the import 
restrictions Russia imposes on its neighboring countries to keep 
them within its political orbit do not affect Russia’s diplomatic 
efforts to challenge the position of Western states on the legality of 
unilateral economic coercion under international law.  However, as 
explained below, this hope may be illusive. 
 
4.4. The Ukraine-related Sanctions as a New-Old Challenge 
 
The U.S.-E.U. cooperative efforts to increase economic pressure 
on Russia in response to its actions in Ukraine imposed significant 
costs on key sectors of Russian economy.  According to the recent 
CRS report, economic sanctions against Russia are assessed as an 
important factor that contributes to the significant deterioration of 
Russia’s economy, marked by capital flight, depreciation of the 
ruble, rising inflation, weaker growth prospects, and budgetary 
pressures.198  For instance, the growth forecast for Russia’s economic 
                                                     
198 See REBECCA M. NELSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43895, U.S. SANCTIONS ON 
RUSSIA: ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 14 (2015), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/ 
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growth in 2015 of the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development is minus 4.8 percent.199  The International Monetary 
Fund in January 2015 lowered its forecast for 2015 from growing by 
0.5 percent to contracting by 3.0 percent.200  Nevertheless, the 
sanctions confrontation results in increased domestic support for 
Russia’s foreign policy.  According to a sociological survey 
conducted in January 2015 by the Levada Center, an independent 
polling agency, found that 68 percent of Russians said Russia should 
“continue its policies despite the sanctions.”201 
However, unlike previous conflict situations between Russia 
and the West, to confirm its current ambitions to be a regional 
superpower today, Russia has to find something more than merely 
symbolical or symmetrical responses to the West’s collective 
measures.202  In view of the obvious ineffectiveness of equivalent, 
reciprocal responses to hostile U.S. moves, Russia’s “responses 
should be [not only] asymmetrical and ‘creative,’ but also . . . 
systemic and strategic.”203  Given the long history of sanctions 
deployed against the Soviet Union, and other notorious examples of 
U.S. sanctions campaigns against dissenting states, the Russian elite 
                                                     
crs/row/R43895.pdf. Nelson also highlighted a difficulty to assess the impact of 
those sanctions separate from other factors, particularly low oil prices.  Id.  Some 
experts also believe that although economic sanctions affected Russia’s ability to 
raise capital, ironically, the consequences of them often hurt Western companies 
more than Russian exporters.  See Stephen Bierman, Strange World of Russian 
Sanctions Levies Uneven Penalties, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 17, 2015, 7:01 PM EST), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-18/the-strange-world-of-
russian-sanctions-levies-uneven-penalties.  
199 Anthony Williams, Oil-driven Russia Downturn Adds to Weakness in EBRD 
Economies (Jan. 19, 2015), http://www.ebrd.com/news/2015/oildriven-russia-
downturn-adds-to-weakness-in-ebrd-economies.html. 
200 IMF, World Economic Outlook (WEO) Update, Cross Currents, Jan. 2015, 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/update/01/pdf/ 
0115.pdf.  
201 Press Release, Levada Center, Sanctions (Feb. 02, 2015), http://www. 
levada.ru/eng/sanctions-0. 
202 See Fyodor Lukyanov, Russia’s Asymmetrical Response: Global Aikido in COSTS 
OF A NEW COLD WAR: THE U.S.-RUSSIA CONFRONTATION OVER UKRAINE 9, 10-12 (Paul 
J. Saunders ed., 2014), available at http://ukrainewatch.cftni.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/Costs-of-a-New-Cold-War.pdf. As Lukyanov wittily 
points out, key principles of oriental martial arts (i.e., “the ability to first avoid a 
heavier opponent’s overpowering attacks and to then turn the opponent’s weight 
advantage against him by using momentum and inertia”) would prevail in this 
confrontation.  Id. 
203 Id. 
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believes that current sanctions regime will continue for many years, 
and considers them rather as retributive measures purported to 
change the political regime in Russia.204 
The most predictable consequence of the sanctions regime is that 
Russia is seeking out alternative economic partners to squeeze out 
European and U.S. companies from the Russian market.205  Yurgens 
observes the following: “Russia is too big to isolate completely, 
however, and partial isolation is likely to have unintended 
consequences that contradict U.S. and European intent in imposing 
sanctions.”206  For instance, in 2014, despite the broadly announced 
international isolation of Russia, Russia and China signed more than 
40 deals including a currency swap.  This swap is a large $400-billion 
contract to build the pipeline to supply natural gas to China from 
gas fields in Eastern Siberia,207 and the smaller contract connecting 
Asian customers with Gazprom’s gas deposits in Eastern Siberia.208  
The latter, in theory, may allow Russia to divert energy supplies, 
currently headed to Europe, to China.209  In the same manner, Russia 
                                                     
204 For instance, Russian Foreign Minister observed the following: 
Formerly, . . . our Western partners, when discussing the DPRK, Iran or 
other states, said that it was necessary to formulate the restrictions in such 
a way as to keep within humanitarian limits and not to cause damage to 
the social sphere and the economy, and to selectively target only the elite.  
Today everything is the other way around: Western leaders are publicly 
declaring that the sanctions should destroy the economy and trigger 
popular protests.  So, as regards the conceptual approach to the use of 
coercive measures the West unequivocally demonstrates that it does not 
merely seek to change Russian policy (which in itself is illusory), but it 
seeks to change the regime - and practically nobody denies this. 
Sergey Lavrov, the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Remarks at the XXII 
Assembly of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (22 Nov. 22, 2014), available at 
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/24454A08D48F695EC3257D9A004BA32E.  
205 See NELSON, supra note 8, at 13 (describing Russia’s attempts to find new 
economic partners in Latin America and Asia). 
206 Igor Yurgens, Targeted Sanctions with an Unclear Target in COSTS OF A NEW 
COLD WAR: THE U.S.-RUSSIA CONFRONTATION OVER UKRAINE 39, 49 (Paul J. Saunders 
ed., 2014), available at http://ukrainewatch.cftni.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/ 
10/Costs-of-a-New-Cold-War.pdf. 
207 See Peter Baker, As Russia Draws Closer to China, U.S. Faces a New Challenge, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/09/world/vladimir-
putin-xi-jinping-form-closer-ties.html (discussing Russia’s efforts to deepen 
economic cooperation with China). 
208 Andrew E. Kramer, Gazprom Makes a New Gas Deal With China, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 10, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/11/business/international/ 
gazprom-makes-a-new-gas-deal-with-china.html.  
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expanded economic cooperation with Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, 
India, Turkey and some other countries.  In light of these 
developments, it seems that Russia has good chances to 
minimize the negative impact of Western sanctions on its economy. 
Experts remark that present conflict differs from Cold War-era 
tensions because of the absence of an ideological basis for the 
conflict.  Therefore, there are two other options to impose political 
and strategic costs on the United States that are more preferable for 
Russia than merely a classical geopolitical rivalry.210  First, Russia 
should terminate all existing, and avoid any further assistance to the 
United States.211  Pursuant to this strategy, Russia can cease to 
cooperate with the United States on a wide range of issues, 
including NATO’s operation in Afghanistan, Iran’s nuclear 
program, Syria’s civil war, the conflict between North and South 
Korea, and a rise of the terroristic Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIS).  For instance, current tensions negatively affected 
U.S.-Russia nuclear security collaboration.212  In response to NASA’s 
announcement of the suspension of most contacts with Russian 
space agency,213 Russia rejected the U.S. proposal to extend 
cooperation on the International Space Station and restricted 
exports of its rocket engines to the United States.214 
The second option is “to take advantage of America’s setbacks 
in global governance and of the shortcomings in the global economic 
                                                     
210 Supra note 2, at 16-17.  
211 Id. 
212 See, e.g., Michael R. Gordon, Russia to Curtail Nuclear Security Efforts With 
U.S., INT’L N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/ 
world/europe/russia-to-curtail-nuclear-security-efforts-with-us-officials-say. 
html?_r=0; Peter Baker, Russia Plans to Boycott 2016 Nuclear Meeting Hosted by 
Obama, INT’L N.Y. TIMES,  Nov. 6, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/ 
11/06/world/europe/russia-plans-to-boycott-2016-nuclear-meeting-hosted-by-
obama-.html; Matthew Bunn, The Real Nuclear Nightmare When It Comes to U.S.-
Russian Ties, The National Interest, Jan. 24, 2015, 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-real-nuclear-nightmare-when-it-comes-
us-russian-ties-12102. 
213 See Kenneth Chang & Peter Baker, NASA Breaks Most Contact With Russia, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/world/europe/ 
nasa-breaks-most-contact-with-russia.html.  
214 See Matthew Bodner, Russia Retaliates Against U.S. Space Program in Response 
to Sanctions, THE MOSCOW TIMES, May 13, 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes. 
com/business/article/russia-retaliates-against-us-space-program-in-response-to-
sanctions/500079.html.  
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architecture.”215  As Lukyanov stresses, the U.S. threat to use global 
economy leverages for political purposes (e.g., to exclude Russian 
banks from VISA and MasterCard payment systems, to limit 
Russia’s access to foreign software, to shut Russia out of the SWIFT 
system of international banking payments) encourages Russia to 
undermine the U.S.-led global economic architecture.216  For 
example, Russia enhanced its coordination with China to develop 
their integration projects (Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union and 
China’s Silk Road Economic Belt) in response to recent U.S. efforts 
to promote new U.S.-centric economic zones (the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership and the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership), and agreed with other the BRICS states to use national 
payment systems in relations between the BRICS members and to 
establish the BRICS development bank.217  Furthermore, to minimize 
Russia’s economic dependence to the West, Sergey Glazyev, a 
Russian presidential advisor on economic matters, proposed the 
following steps aimed at the protection of the national economy 
from economic sanctions: 
 move government assets and accounts denominated 
in U.S. dollars and Euros from NATO countries to 
neutral nations; 
 sell NATO nations’ bonds; 
 return state-owned property to Russia; 
 stop exports of precious metals, rare earths, and other 
strategic metals and minerals; 
 execute currency and credit swaps with China to 
finance critical imports; 
 build a SWIFT-like domestic system for interbank 
information sharing within the CIS, along with a 
domestic payment system; 
 work to introduce a capital flight tax; 
 gradually transition to domestic currency 
settlements vis-à-vis trade partners; 
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 radically reduce the share of U.S. dollar instruments 
and debt of other pro-sanctions nations as a 
percentage of Russia’s foreign currency reserves; 
 replace U.S. dollar and Euro-denominated loans of 
state-owned corporations and state-owned banks 
with ruble-denominated loans; and 
 transfer offshore-registered titles to strategic 
enterprises, and transfer mineral rights, real estate, 
and other property back to domestic jurisdiction.218 
In addition to political measures taken at the international level, 
President Putin signed the Executive Order No. 560 on August 6, 
2014, 219 placing a one-year import embargo on certain agricultural 
products and food originating from the states that deployed 
sanctions against Russia’s legal entities and individuals.  Given that 
Russia was the second most important destination for European 
agricultural products, these countermeasures were designed to 
retaliate increased costs of politic and economic confrontation for 
the EU states,220 and, consequently, to deter them from expanding 
sanctions regime against Russia. 
Russia has not implemented other “asymmetrical” retaliatory 
measures proposed by domestic politicians that Russia might use to 
hit sender states back including, for instance:  to ban Western 
                                                     
218 Supra note 6 at 46-47. 
219 Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii o Primenenii Otdel’nykh 
Spetsial’nykh Ekonomicheskikh Mer v Tseliakh Obespecheniia Bezopasnosti 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Executive Order of the President of the Russian Federation 
on the Use of Certain Special Economic Measures for the Purposes of National 
Security Assurance of the Russian Federation] SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA 
ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [RUSSIAN FEDERATION COLLECTION OF LEGISLATION] 
2014, No. 32, Item 4470.   
220 For an assessment of its potential impact on the European economy, see 
SUSANNE KRAATZ, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, BRIEFING, PE 536.291, THE RUSSIAN 
EMBARGO: IMPACT ON THE ECONOMIC AND EMPLOYMENT SITUATION IN THE EU (2014), 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2014/ 
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airlines from flying over its territory,221 to ban gold exportation,222 or 
to expropriate the assets of U.S. and E.U. companies.223  Meanwhile, 
at least two anti-sanctions bills are currently under consideration in 
Russia’s State Duma.  On January 20, 2015, the State Duma passed 
in its first reading Bill No. 662902-6224 on the recognition as 
"undesired" of a foreign and international organization if it poses a 
threat to Russia’s constitutional system or national security.  The Bill 
provides the freezing of assets of such undesired entities, and the 
prohibition of activity of their offices, or any distribution of their 
information materials within the territory of the Russian 
Federation.225 
The second is Bill No. 607554-6226 (so-called “Rotenberg Law”), 
providing financial compensation to Russian companies and 
individuals suffering from foreign economic sanctions by virtue of 
the expropriation of foreign-owned assets in Russia.227  Despite wide 
                                                     
221 See Elizabeth Piper, Russia Hints at Flight Ban in Response to New Sanctions, 
REUTERS (Sep. 8, 2014, 11:55am EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/ 
09/08/us-ukraine-crisis-medvedev-idUSKBN0H309G20140908 (last visited Feb. 
17, 2015) (citing a statement of Russia’s Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev 
regarding asymmetrical responses to Western sanctions available to Russian 
government). 
222 See Yuliya Fedorinova & Anna Andrianova, Russian Central Bank Sees No 
Need for Proposed Gold-Export Ban, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 18, 2014, 7:54 AM EST), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-18/russian-central-bank-
sees-no-need-for-proposed-gold-export-ban (last visited Feb. 17, 2015) (discussing 
a proposal of State Duma deputies to impose the Gold-Export Ban). 
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expropriation-of-foreign-companies-assets.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2015) 
(analyzing three bills announced as a response to the economic sanctions imposed 
by the United States and the EU against Russia).  
224 Bill No. 662902-6 and accompanying materials are available at 
http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/main.nsf/%28SpravkaNew%29?OpenAgent&RN= 
662902-6&02 (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
225 See Pavel Koshkin, The Kremlin Might Create a List of 'Undesired' Foreign 
Organizations, RUSSIA DIRECT (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.russia-direct.org/               
analysis/kremlin-might-create-list-undesired-foreign-organizations (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2015) (discussing the bill on the “undesired” organizations). 
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227 See Andrew E. Kramer, Russia Seeks Sanctions Tit for Tat, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 
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criticism from Russian expert society, the Rotenberg Law was 
preliminary adopted by the State Duma in October 2014, and now is 
subject to the second and third readings.  It is likely that a general 
purpose of passing this bill is to pose a threat to the assets of U.S. 
transnational corporations (e.g., Chevron, General Electric, 
Caterpillar, Ford Motor, General Motors, PepsiCo, Mars, and Kraft 
Foods) in Russia, and, thereby, to draw U.S.-E.U. attention to what 
other leverages Russia has. 
With respect to Russia’s legal response on the international level, 
Russia stands on its traditional position that the economic sanctions 
campaign launched by Western states violates international law, 
including sender states’ obligations under the WTO.228  Russia’s 
Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev also announced that Russia 
would challenge the U.S. and European economic sanctions in the 
WTO.229  At the same time, a number of sanctioned companies and 
individuals brought actions against the European Council in the 
European Court of Justice to contest the imposition of the Ukraine-
related sanctions by the European Union.230 
 
4.5. Implications for Russia’s Foreign Policy 
 
Although one might argue that Russia’s use of economic 
sanctions without the authorization of the U.N. Security Council is 
a violation of international law -- as, indeed, it is; when one 
                                                     
228 See, e.g., Interview with Sergey Lavrov, the Foreign Minister of the Russian 
Federation, in Kommersant (Dec. 25, 2014) (transcript available at http:// 
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conceptual approaches of our Western colleagues to international economic 
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considered Russia's actions from the point of view of the formation 
of a new international customary rule as embodied in regular U.N. 
General Assembly resolutions,231  this prior argument appears to 
lose sight of the expansion of unilateral sanctions regimes in recent 
decades. 
Alexander points to the general trend toward the acceptance by 
states practice of economic sanctions as a legitimate instrument of 
international coercion.232  Similarly, Egle argues that “[t]he growth 
of sanctions activity in the twentieth century and the new 
implementation of sanctions by the U.S., United Kingdom, and EU, 
independently of the U.N., indicate a greater acceptance of sanctions 
in customary international law.”233  Interpreting modern sanctions 
practice, Lowenfield concludes that unilateral sanctions have 
become sufficiently common and tolerated as a tool of foreign 
relations, and, hence, “the suggestion that economic sanctions are 
unlawful unless approved by the Security Council . . . is obsolete.”234 
In my view, however, these arguments in favor of greater 
recognition of unilateral sanctions might be rebutted.  Customary 
international law is a broadly recognized authority resulting from a 
general and consistent practice of states (objective element) followed 
by them from a sense of legal obligation (subjective element).235  
                                                     
231 See Ted Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the 
Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT'L. L. J. 457, 463-468 (1985) 
(describing a law-making process of international customary principles on the basis 
of positions adopted in U.N. organs). See also generally NOORA ARAJÄRVI, THE 
CHANGING NATURE OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: METHODS OF INTERPRETING 
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interpretation of the U.N. Charter “in accordance with the corresponding will of 
the majority of states.” See Brosche, supra note 78, at 23. 
232 ALEXANDER, supra note 104, at 63.  
233 Egle, supra note 126, at 34. 
234 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Unilateral Versus Collective Sanctions: An American’s 
Perception, in UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 95, 96 (Vera 
Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2001). 
235 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 (1986) 
(identifying customary international law as a source of international law); Military 
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Consequently, to prove the objective element proponents of 
sanctions one must show that the absolute majority of states use 
unilateral economic sanctions (not only a number of developed 
countries).  To establish the second element, one must provide 
evidence that sender states formally expressed their belief in the 
legal nature of their actions.  Even if we assume that both elements 
have been already met with reference to the existing unilateral 
sanction practice and statements of the United States and some other 
nations, in any way it would be very difficult to overrule the 
counter-argument concerning a binding character of the prohibition 
of the unilateral use of economic coercion.  There is a negative 
practice of a majority of states abstaining from the application of 
unilateral economic sanctions, because they believe in the 
unlawfulness of such a behavior considering respective declarations 
and resolutions of the General Assembly as enough evidence of 
opinio juris.236  Admittedly, either a principle of customary 
international law exists, or a process of formation of customary 
international law by majority of states proceeds, regardless of 
expanding practice of several recalcitrant actors (persistent 
objectors) even as politically and economically powerful as the 
United States or European Union.  
In addition, it is noteworthy that most modern sanctions regimes 
are imposed by sender states invoking political or ideological rather 
than legal arguments.  As the International Court of Justice pointed 
out, even if a state justified political expediency of its actions against 
another state, it did not mean that those actions were legally 
justifiable.237 
                                                     
and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 77, at 97 (defining that customary 
international law consists of “practice and opinion juris of states”).  It is also notable 
that most Russian authors also support views that a customary norm consists of 
those two elements.  See Igor I. Lukashuk, Customary Norms in Contemporary 
International Law in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THERSHOLD OF THE 21TH 
CENTURY 487, 493-495 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1996).  Lukashuk, however, argues that 
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236 See, e.g., ARAJÄRVI, supra note 23, at 20-21 (arguing that the negative practice 
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with regard to prohibiting rules); LEPARD, supra note 23, at 219-220 (“Key is whether 
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On the other hand, Russia’s practice of the application of tacit 
sanctions to trade relations with neighboring states, as described in 
Section 4.3 above, undermines the basis of Russian argumentation.  
From Russia’s neighboring countries perspective, there is no 
significant difference between Russia and the United States because 
both of them look like “bully’ nation[s] attempting to impose and 
enforce its own standards on weaker states with backgrounds 
perceived as aberrant or anomalous to [Russian or U.S.] interests.”238  
Even if the contemporary government of Russia finds short-term 
advantages in the active use of economic coercion measures against 
its “near abroad” states invoking the violations of sanitary, 
phytosanitary or technical standards, its long terms interests are 
likely to be best served by its voluntary strict conformity with 
Russia’s traditional position of the illegality of unilateral economic 
sanctions.  
The current sanctions campaign against Russia reinforces my 
argument, but previous practice of tacit trade sanctions may cause 
Russia a bad turn.  Based on the principle ex injuria jus non oritur, it 
may not only preclude Russia’s potential claims (if any) against 
sender states as inadmissible, but also overall negatively affect long-
terms efforts of Russia and developing countries to attribute legal 
force to the prohibition of the unilateral use of economic coercion.  
Therefore, from a practical perspective, in current circumstances it 
seems more logical for Russia to proceed with its support for views 
on the illegality of unilateral economic sanctions, but change its 
approach to the use of restrictive trade measures for political 
purposes and, and deescalate existing trade tensions with 
neighboring states. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
The “sanctions war” between the West and Russia, the worst 
crisis since the end of the Cold War, again raises the issue of whether 
the unilateral use of economic sanctions is permissible under 
international law.  In contrast with the U.S. position that unilateral 
economic sanctions should be deemed as legitimate self-help acts 
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and elements of U.S. economic statecraft, Russia follows in the 
Soviet Union’s footsteps, blaming the United States and its allies for 
the violation of international law.  However, while on political and 
diplomatic levels the United States and Russia demonstrate opposite 
views on this issue, the analysis of the contemporary sanction 
activity of both states shows a lot of surprising similarities.  Despite 
the fact that Russia avoids to use U.S.-style explicit economic 
sanctions, the current practice of posing tacit trade restrictions on its 
neighboring states might undermine Russia’s traditional arguments 
justifying the unlawful character of any unilateral sanctions, 
including the current anti-Russia sanctions campaign, and even lead 
to more recognition of unilateral sanctions as a part of international 
customary law. 
We recognize that recent developments of U.S. sanction practice 
– the increased role of smart sanctions, deepened international 
cooperation and flexible approaches towards the revocability of 
coercive measures – theoretically may result in the more effective 
implementation of sanction regimes.  From our point of view, 
however, similarly to the previous waves of unilateral sanctions 
against the Soviet Union, the current sanction campaign against 
Russia is ill fated, because Russia’s economic status and global 
political influence make complete economic isolation impossible.  
Rather than resolve conflict situation through international 
dialogue, the sanctions lead to the escalation of the West-Russia 
conflict and, hence, further destabilization of the international 
system. 
Unfortunately, political elites often forget that any economic 
sanction is a double-edged weapon designed to inflict economic 
suffering on other nations rather than to sue for peace, and the use 
of that dangerous weapon has to be limited by international law.  It 
seems clear that governments and the international community 
must cooperate to ensure the evolution of the principles of 
international law concerning the permissible and impermissible 
economic coercion provided that political tensions should not affect 
international trade.  Discussing a bilateral effect of economic 
sanctions, Andrea Ovans in her recent article in Harvard Business 
Review wrote: 
Ever since the spectacular success of the Marshall Plan in 
using mutual trade pacts to end more than two millennia of 
war between France and Germany, business and 
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governments have put their faith in international trade as a 
stabilizing force . . . .  That of course is the ultimate irony of 
embargoes — they’re a tactic aimed at avoiding a fight by 
not doing business together.  Certainly a trade war is better 
than a nuclear war.  But in resorting to a trade war, we give 
up the only tool that’s ever been known to put an enduring 
end to actual war.239 
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